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ABSTRACT 
 The first essay attempts to explain the heterogeneity in the stock market’s reaction to a 
firm’s lobbying for good efforts. It is hypothesized that higher (a) CEO equity-to-pay ratio, (b) 
marketing influence in the TMT, (c) marketing capabilities, (d) corporate social performance, and 
(e) institutional ownership, will be associated with less negative abnormal stock returns. Results 
indicate that firms with a greater amount of marketing influence in the top management team 
experience greater negative abnormal returns. While firms with a higher CEO equity-to-pay ratio 
and a greater level of institutional ownership experience less negative abnormal returns. 
The second essay explores the impact of a consumer boycott on the shareholder wealth of 
the competitors of the targeted firm. It is hypothesized that similarities between the target and the 
competitor will result in less of a competition effect. Additionally, its hypothesized that firms with 
higher (a) advertising, (b) marketing influence in the TMT, (c) marketing capabilities, and (d) 
corporate social performance will experience a greater competition effect. Results indicate that 
firms with greater institutional ownership overlap and marketing capabilities experience less and 
more of a competition effect, respectively. 
The third and final essay focuses on the impact of a consumer boycott on long-term firm 
value (i.e., buy-and-hold abnormal returns) for the targeted firms. It is hypothesized that firms with 
greater amount of corporate political activity experience more negative buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns. Furthermore, firms with a marketing CEO will experience less negative buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns and this effect is mediated by marketing influence in the TMT and marketing 
capabilities.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In January of 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision in the 
landmark and controversial case, Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission. In a 5-4 
decision, the Supreme Court deemed that the laws that barred corporations political spending was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. As result, the constraints placed on corporations with 
regards to a corporation’s ability to spend money on elections were relaxed and we have seen 
increase in both the frequency and amount of corporate political activity (Coates, 2012).   
 Researchers across several fields have labeled this type of firm action as corporate political 
activity. Prior research has defined corporate political activity as a firm’s efforts to influence the 
political arena through several avenues including “contributions to campaigns, lobbying, 
testimony done before legislators and regulators, the operation of government relations offices, 
and contributions made to political action committees” (Lux et al., 2011). With regards to 
lobbying, prior research has provided an indication that there are several kinds of lobbying such 
as corporate lobbying, (Chen et al., 2015), ethical lobbying (Wettstein & Baur, 2016) and lobbying 
for good (Peterson & Pfitzer, 2009).  
 A firm’s effort to influence the political arena can have an impact on both public policy 
(Hilland & Hitt, 1999) and the firm performance (Shaffer et al., 2000). Specifically, the studies 
that have examined corporate political activity and firm performance has found inconsistent 
results. Thus, in order to address this limitation with corporate political activity literature, 
researchers could look to examine why some firms are punished or rewarded more than others
 2 
Another outcome of a firm’s political activity that has become more prevalent in today’s highly 
polarized society is the call for consumer boycotts. When it comes to business and politics, there 
was this longstanding belief that businesses should stick to making products and providing services 
while staying out of politics. However, in recent years, we have seen more and more businesses 
getting involved in politics through lobbying and contributions or taking political stances. For 
instance, in 2017 under the leadership of Howard Schulz, Starbucks took a political stance with 
regards to the issue of refugees by vowing to hire them. While some of Starbuck’s stakeholders 
(e.g., employees and customers) may be supportive of this stance, others may either disagree with 
the stance or disagree with Starbucks taking a political stance of any kind because they fear that 
such an action will alienate various stakeholders. As expected there were some people that 
disagreed with Starbucks and as a result some individuals called for a boycott of the Seattle-based 
coffee chain.  
With regards to prior literature, researchers have defined a consumer boycott as an “attempt 
by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from 
making selected purchases in the marketplace” (Friedman, 1985). In other words, a consumer 
boycott is a form of anti-consumption (Makarem & Jae, 2016). Prior research has examined 
consumer boycotts in terms of the (1) causes of boycotts (Innes, 2006), (2) motivations for 
engaging in a boycott (John & Klein, 2003), and (3) the outcomes of boycotts (Klein et al., 2004). 
However, in order to get a better understanding of the impact that consumer boycotts have on the 
business world as a whole, research could look at their impact on the competitors to see if they 
benefit from the targeted firm’s misfortune or misstep or the if there is any long-term effects of a 
consumer boycott.  
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In order to investigate these limitations and gaps in the research, the three essays which 
follow use three different perspectives to capture the impact of when business and politics mix. 
Unlike prior research, these studies incorporated a marketing aspect and examined how the 
interface of business and politics impacts shareholder wealth. Using signaling theory, and agency 
and upper-echelon literature as support, the essays that follow hope to address these limitations 
and drive future marketing research to investigate the role that marketing plays in the intersection 
of business and politics.  
Essay 1 
 Essay 1 investigates the relationship between a firm’s political activity, specifically its 
lobbying for goods efforts, and shareholder wealth (i.e., abnormal returns). Drawing from 
signaling theory, the author focuses on a handful of moderating factors related to corporate 
governance, marketing, and social responsibility to determine why abnormal returns vary between 
firms. The results of this essay suggest that the market reacts negatively to a firm that engages in 
lobbying for good. Furthermore, the results indicate that this negative market reaction varies based 
on the CEO’s equity-to-pay, the amount of marketing influence in the TMT, and institutional 
ownership. Specifically, firms whose CEO has a higher equity-to-pay ratio and those with a greater 
amount of institutional ownership experience less of a negative reaction from investors (i.e., less 
negative abnormal returns). While on the other and contradictory to what was hypothesized, firms 
with higher marketing influence in the TMT experience more of a negative reaction from investors 
(i.e., greater negative abnormal returns). 
Essay Two 
 Essay 2 investigates the relationship between a consumer boycott and the shareholder 
wealth for competitors of the targeted firms. Drawing from signaling theory, the author focuses on 
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a handful of moderating factors related to similarities between the targeted firm and its 
competitors, marketing, and social responsibility to determine why the market reactions vary from 
to firm to firm when a consumer boycott occurs. The results of this essay demonstrate that the 
market reacts positively to a consumer boycott when it comes to competing firms. In other words, 
the competitors experience a competition effect. Additionally, the results also indicate that the 
market’s positive reaction varies based on the amount of institutional ownership overlap and a 
firm’s marketing capabilities. Specifically, firms with a greater amount of institutional ownership 
overlap with the targeted firm experience less of a positive reaction from investors (i.e., less 
positive abnormal returns). Whereas firms with a greater amount of marketing capabilities 
experience a more positive reaction from investors (i.e., more positive abnormal returns).  
Essay Three 
Essay 3 investigates the relationship between a consumer boycott and long-term firm value for 
those firms that became the target of a consumer boycott. Specifically, this essay examines how a 
consumer boycott impacts a firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Drawing from upper echelon 
and corporate political activity literature, the author focuses a couple of moderating factors related 
to a firm’s political activities and the background of the firm’s CEO. Additionally, the examines 
how a CEO’s background moderating impact on the relationship between a consumer boycott and 
long-term firm value is mediated by a firm’s marketing influence in the TMT and marketing 
capabilities. The results of this essay suggest that the market reacts negatively in the year following 
a consumer boycott. However, there was no support for the hypotheses related to a firm’s political 
activity, a CEO’s background, or the mediation hypotheses. Nonetheless, the results do provide 
some interesting points that are worth discussing.  
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Conclusion 
 Together these three essays have important implications for practitioners including 
managers, board of directors, and investors. These essays also provide contributions to areas of 
research in marketing, corporate governance, corporate political activity, consumer boycotts, and 
social activism. These implications are discussed in greater detail in the essays that follow.  
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II. ESSAY ONE: I’LL BE THERE FOR YOU: INVESTORS’ RESPONSE TO A FIRM’S 
LOBBYING FOR GOOD EFFORT 
 
Introduction 
 
Firms engaging in the political process is not a sudden revelation. In fact, from 2007-2017, 
some of the most recognizable and well-known firms in the U.S. have donated millions of dollars 
to politicians and other political entities. Specifically, during that time span, firms such as General 
Electric and Johnson & Johnson have donated a total amount of $1.75 and $1.98 million, 
respectively (Cain, 2018). Firms entering the political arena through donations falls under the 
notion of corporate political activity (CPA). From a broad sense, CPA is a firm’s effort to influence 
the political process through lobbying or making contributions.  
Lobbying is defined as “the political activities that special interests, including corporations, 
are engaged in to influence legislators at various levels of the government” (Chen et al., 2015). 
Prior research has indicated that there are different types of lobbying including corporate lobbying 
(Chen et al., 2015), ethical lobbying (Wettstein & Baur, 2016) and lobbying for good (Peterson & 
Pfitzer, 2009). In the present study, the author focuses on lobbying for good. According to 
Wettstein & Baur (2016) lobbying for good is a firm’s effort to influence the political arena not 
only to benefit its own financial interests, but also to advance some type of social change. 
However, as with most things related to politics, not everyone is going to have the same opinion 
on things. Thus, not every member of society is going to agree with a firm’s lobbying for good 
efforts or the type of social change that the firm is trying to advance. For example, it’s probably 
safe to assume that not everyone agreed with the stance that Apple Inc. and some other firms too  
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when they joined forces to file an amicus brief (i.e., friend of the court) in support of a 
marriage equality case being heard by the Supreme Court. 
Prior research that has investigated CPA, has looked at the antecedents, types of CPA, 
organizational implementation, and outcomes (Hillman et al., 2004). However, very little attention 
has been given towards other types of CPA and different ways in which firms get involved with 
politics. For instance, with regards to the business world, most of the prior research has focused 
on corporate lobbying through lobbying expenditures. So, in order to provide further insight into 
the world of business and politics, the author aims to examine how lobbying for good through the 
filing of an amicus brief impacts shareholder wealth. Additionally, prior research has given very 
little attention to the role of marketing, social performance, and corporate governance when it 
comes to a firm’s political activity. Due to the lack of research in this area, the author addresses 
the following questions: (1) Are a firm’s lobbying for good efforts likely to decrease shareholder 
wealth? (2) What are the marketing, social responsibility, and governance-related boundary 
conditions under which a firm engaging in lobbying for good will experience a smaller decrease 
in shareholder wealth?  
 The author argues that news of a firm’s political activity, specifically lobbying for good, is 
likely to increase an investor’s perceived uncertainty due to the risk associated with political 
activity. Drawing from signaling theory and resource-based view (RBV) literature, the author 
argues that certain marketing and corporate responsibility-related resources are likely to alleviate 
some of the uncertainty that comes with political activity. Additionally, based on signaling theory 
and agency literature, the author argues that a certain governance-related factors are also likely to 
reduce some of the uncertainty associated with a firm’s political activities.  
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 Figure 1.1 outlines the conceptual framework of the author’s research. The author tests this 
framework using a data set that consists of 201 firms that engaged in lobbying for good through 
being a part of an amicus brief that was filed with the Supreme Court. The results reveal that 
lobbying for good via the filing of an amicus brief resulted in negative abnormal returns for those 
firms listed on the legal document. Furthermore, firms with greater marketing influence in the top 
management team were found to experience a more negative abnormal return. Lastly, firms with 
a greater CEO equity-to-pay ratio and institutional ownership experience a less negative abnormal 
return.  
Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework of the Link Between Lobbying for Good and 
Shareholder Wealth 
 
 
 Based on these findings, the author makes several contributions to existing literature. First, 
the author extends corporate political activity literature by demonstrating the effect of lobbying 
for good on shareholder wealth (i.e., stock price). Second, the findings extend corporate 
governance literature by demonstrating the role it plays with regards to improving firm 
performance. Specifically, both a CEO’s compensation structure and the amount of institutional 
ownership help to reduce the uncertainty associated with a firm’s political activity and as a result 
reduce the market’s negative response. Third, the author extends marketing research by 
demonstrating that marketing influence fails to serve as a signaling benefit when it comes to a 
firm’s political activities.  
Corporate Political Activity 
(Lobbying for Good)
Shareholder 
Wealth
Marketing 
Marketing Influence in TMT
Marketing Capability
Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate Social Performance
Corporate Governance 
CEO Compensation
Corporate Governance
Insitutional Ownership
H1 (-)
H2 (+)
H3,4 (+) H5	(+) H6	(+)
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Theoretical Framework 
 First developed when examining labor markets, signaling theory (Spence, 1974) focuses 
on situations in which there is asymmetric information. Ideally, the company and its stakeholders 
(e.g., investors, employees, customers, etc.) would have the same information, and this problem 
of asymmetry wouldn’t arise. With regards to a firm’s political activity, there is some asymmetry 
of information that exists between the stakeholders and the firm. For instance, firms that engage 
in politics have more information about their political activities and the potential outcome of it 
than other stakeholders. So, in order to deal with this asymmetric information, firms can provide 
signals of their own. With regards to the present study, these signals include those related to 
marketing, corporate social responsibility, and corporate governance.  
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Corporate Political Activity  
Following the decision in the landmark, but also controversial Supreme Court case, 
Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, corporate political activity has increased both 
in frequency and amount (Coates, 2012). CPA is defined as the firm’s efforts to influence the 
political arena through “campaign contributions, lobbying, testimony before legislators and 
regulators, operating government relations offices, and contributing to industry and trade political 
action committees (PACs)” (Lux et al., 2011). According to Stigler (1971), the motivation for 
firms to enter the political arena is derived from government regulation and policy having an 
impact on most firms. However, the firm’s benefit is not the only motivation for a firm’s political 
activity. In fact, a firm will also engage in political activity because they are corporate citizens 
(Matten & Crane, 2005; Moon et al., 2005; Wood & Logsdon, 2008). In other words, a firm’s 
political role comes from the idea of promoting social welfare (Scherer et al., 2013; Azola, 2013). 
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CPA has been widely studied in a variety of disciplines including management, economics, 
political science, and sociology. Such research has examined CPA with regards to antecedents 
(Hillman, 2003), types of CPA (Blumentritt, 2003), organizational implementation (Bonardi, 
2004), and the outcomes of CPA including changes in public policy or firm performance (e.g.., 
gross profit margin or market share) (Shaffer et al., 2000). Specifically, the impact of CPA on firm 
performance has resulted in inconsistent findings. For instance, some researchers have found the 
relationship between CPA and firm performance to be negative (Aggarwal et al., 2012), some have 
found a positive relationship (Hadani & Schuler, 2013), and others have found no relationship 
between CPA and firm performance (Hersch et al., 2008). Research that sheds light on these 
inconsistent findings is limited in at least two ways.  
First, little research has been conducted to understand whether certain firm’s that engage 
in political activities are punished differently, and if so, what are the reasons for such differences. 
Second, the existing literature on corporate political activity (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Hadani & 
Schuler et al., 2013; Hersch et al., 2008; Shaffer et al., 2000), focuses on performance variables 
such as gross profit margin, market share, market value, Tobin’s q, and excess returns. Thus, in 
order to address these limitations, the author conducted an event study of a firm’s political 
activities and explains why the author expects the stock market to react more or less negatively to 
certain firms.  
Corporate Political Activity: Lobbying  
As for lobbying, prior research defines it as a set of activities used to influence legislators 
at the various levels of the government (Chen et al., 2015). Such activities include expenditures 
(Hill et al., 2013) and the communication of information (Chen et al., 2010; Nownes, 2006). One 
such way a firm can disseminate information is through oral or written communication (NCSL, 
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2019). For example, an organization can file an amicus brief (i.e., a friend of the court) to lobby 
the court system (Harper & Etherington, 1953). Prior research investigating the outcomes of 
lobbying has looked at its impact on effective tax rates (Richter et al., 2009), trade protection 
(Drope et al., 2004), firm contracts (Ridge et al., 2017), market entries from competitors 
(Grossman & Stegner, 2008), visa or trade policy (Kerr et al., 2011), fraud detection (Yu & Yu, 
2011), and bailout assistance (Duchin & Sosyura, 2012).  
As previously mentioned, there are various categories of lobbying including corporate 
lobbying, ethical lobbying, or lobbying for good. The focus of the present study is on lobbying for 
good. This idea of lobbying for good and having a firm’s political activity be of benefit to more 
than just the firm falls under this notion that a firm should engage in political activities because 
the firm is a corporate citizen. Prior research has found that lobbying for good has an impact on 
health or education (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Valente & Crane, 2010) and basic rights (Matten & 
Crane, 2005; Wettstein, 2009). However, no study to the author’s knowledge has specifically 
investigated the impact of lobbying for good on shareholder wealth.  
Corporate Political Activity and Firm Performance 
According to agency literature, issues arise when the goals of the firm’s management are 
not in line with its stakeholders. From a CPA perspective, there is an “opaque nature” or 
uncertainty that comes with it (Hadani et al., 2015). This uncertainty and opacity is derived from 
an agency problem that exists because of several different issues associated with a firm’s political 
activities.  
First, senior management that engages in CPA may make additional “risky business 
decisions” (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). Specifically, Igan et al. (2012) demonstrated that a firm’s 
lobbying is associated with taking on higher risk, thus resulting in worsening performance. Second, 
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there is an issue when it comes to the allocation of resources and the opportunity cost associated 
with CPA. Specifically, when a firm engages in CPA, the firm shifts the focus from market 
activities to political activities through the redirection of firm resources (Bonardi, 2008). 
Additionally, there is an opportunity cost that comes with CPA (Bhuyan, 2000). An opportunity 
cost occurs when a firm forgoes or misses a benefit because the firm’s attention is directed at 
something else. In other words, when a firm makes an investment in political activities, it takes 
away from a firm’s ability to invest in areas that are strongly related to improving the firm’s 
products, services, and profits (e.g., resource allocation towards new product development, R&D, 
etc.) (Bhuyan, 2000).  
Third, it is difficult for investors to monitor the political activity of a firm (Hadani & 
Schuler, 2013). This lack of monitoring ability results in information asymmetry (Chaney et al., 
2011; Hadani, 2012; Yu & Yu, 2011) which has been found to be associated with moral hazard 
and increased agency cost (Igan et al., 2012). Lastly, a firm may engage in CPA for reasons other 
than improving firm performance (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). Specifically, senior management 
might engage in political activity for reasons including ideological beliefs, compensation, and job 
security (Tripathi et al., 2002; Arlen & Weiss, 1995; Coates, 2012). This agency problem can then 
have a negative impact on firm performance (Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Borghesi & Chang, 2015).  
Therefore, in line with agency literature, the author expects that there will be a level of 
opacity and misallocation of resources because of a firm’s lobbying for good efforts. Thus, a firm’s 
efforts to lobby for good will result in a negative impact on shareholder wealth. Hence, the author 
hypothesizes, 
H1: The announcement of a firm engaging in lobbying for good is likely to decrease the 
shareholder value. 
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CEO Equity-to-Pay Ratio 
 Drawing from signaling theory and agency literature, the author expects that a CEO’s 
equity-to-pay ratio will reduce some of the uncertainty associated with lobbying for good. Prior 
research has demonstrated that stock options motivate a CEO to be less risk averse (Haugen & 
Senbet, 1981; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002; Sanders, 2001; Tufano, 1996; Sanders & Hambrick, 
2007). As a result, a CEO is incentivized to “invest heavily in uncertain areas” (Sanders & 
Hambrick, 2007) such as political activities (Ozer, 2010). However, a higher equity-to-pay ratio 
for the CEO also helps to align the risk tendencies of the CEO with that of the other shareholders 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2017). 
Thus, a higher CEO equity-to-pay ratio is likely to signal to investors that under the 
leadership of the CEO, the firm is engaging in risky behavior, but not at the expense of the other 
shareholders. Therefore, in line with signaling theory and agency literature, the author expects a 
firm’s engagement in lobbying for good to have less of a negative impact on firm performance 
when a firm’s CEO has a higher equity-to-pay ratio. Thus, the author hypothesizes, 
H2: The greater a firm’s CEO equity-to-pay ratio, the less negative a firm’s abnormal 
returns surrounding a firm’s effort to lobby for good.  
Marketing Influence and Marketing Capabilities 
Drawing from signaling theory and resource-based-view (RBV) literature, the author 
examines the role of two marketing-related resources (i.e., marketing influence and marketing 
capability) and how they can help to reduce the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s lobbying for good 
efforts.  
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Marketing Influence in the Top Management Team 
First, the author expects that a firm’s marketing influence within the top management team 
(TMT) to be an important factor when related to minimizing uncertainty associated with political 
activities. The marketing department often plays a key role in strategic marketing decisions (Nath 
& Mahajan, 2008). Firms where marketing has an influence in the TMT tend to pay more attention 
to the opinions of the customer and serve as a voice for them (Brown et al., 2005; Kerin, 2005). 
Additionally, when marketing has an influence in the TMT, a firm also works to safeguard brand 
and customer equity (McGovern & Quelch, 2004), while taking into account customer insights 
when it comes to formulating firm strategies (Kerin, 2005), and including marketing as a part of 
strategic decisions (Crosby & Johnson, 2005).  
Thus, a higher amount of marketing influence will signal to investors that firm’s lobbying 
for good activities includes the customer and takes their insights into account. Additionally, the 
firm’s political activities will be done in a way that does not damage brand or customer equity, 
thereby, reducing some of the uncertainty. Therefore, in line with signaling theory and RBV 
literature, the author expects a firm’s engagement in lobbying for good to have less of a negative 
impact on firm performance when a firm has a higher marketing influence in the TMT. Hence, the 
author hypothesizes, 
H3: The greater a firm’s marketing influence in the TMT, the less negative a firm’s 
abnormal returns surrounding a firm’s effort to lobby for good.  
Marketing Capability 
Based on RBV literature, a firm’s marketing capability is a firm-specific resource that 
provides the firm with a competitive advantage due to the rarity, inimitability, and sustainability 
of the resource (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Song et al. 2007; Murray et al. 2011; Capron & 
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Hulland 1999; Kozlenkova et al. 2014). Marketing literature has defined marketing capabilities as 
the process by which the firm uses both its tangible and intangible resources to accomplish several 
things including understanding the complex and specific needs of the consumer (Day, 1994; Dutta 
et al., 1999). In other words, marketing capability is the market knowledge that a firm has about 
customer needs, and the experience a firm has with regards to forecasting and responding to those 
needs (Day, 1994). A firm can use this knowledge about consumer needs and work to include them 
in the firm’s political activities. Responding to customer needs by including them in a firm’s 
political activities should lead to sustained customer satisfaction (Hooley et al. 2005; Rapp et al., 
2010; Trainor et al. 2014) and improved future business performance (Morgan & Rego, 2006).  
Thus, a firm with superior marketing capabilities, due to its market knowledge, is likely to 
signal to investors that a firm’s lobbying for good efforts takes into account the needs of customers, 
thereby reducing some of the uncertainty. Therefore, in line with signaling theory and RBV 
literature, the author expects a firm’s lobbying for good efforts to have less of a negative impact 
on performance when a firm has superior marketing capabilities. Hence, the author hypothesizes, 
H4: The greater a firm’s marketing capability, the less negative a firm’s abnormal returns 
surrounding a firm’s effort to lobby for good. 
Corporate Social Performance 
Drawing from signaling theory, and RBV and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
literature, the author expects a firm’s corporate social performance (CSP) to help reduce some of 
the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s lobbying for good efforts. Prior research has demonstrated 
that a “firm’s commitment to CSR allows it to develop a valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable resource in the form of superior corporate reputation” (Kashmiri et al., 2017). A 
superior corporate reputation offers several benefits to a firm including long-term customer loyalty 
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(Maignan & Ferrell, 2004; Lacey et al., 2015), and superior financial performance (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011).  
Additionally, the development of superior social performance has been found to result in a 
“positive moral capital” that offers an insurance-like protection (Godfrey, 2005). According to 
Godfrey (2005), this insurance-like protection limits the damage to customer trust and the 
likelihood of stakeholder sanctions (e.g., boycott) following a negative event. Given the benefits 
that arise from a superior CSP, a firm will work to ensure that it maintains a superior CSP by not 
engaging in any risky activity that would damage it. Thus, a firm with superior social performance 
is likely to signal to investors that a firm’s engagement in lobbying for good will be done in a way 
that prevents any damage to the firm’s social performance, thereby, reducing some of the 
uncertainty and incurring less of a punishment for its political activities.  
In addition to developing a positive moral capital and a buffer, a superior social 
performance can also support a firm’s political activities through (a) access, (b) efficacy, and (c) 
cost (den Hond et al., 2014). In fact, a superior reputation helps to lower the barriers of entry into 
the political arena (Wang & Qian, 2011). This access to the political arena allows for firms to 
develop an alliance with legislators and regulators (Schuler et al., 2002). This political access also 
serves as a valuable resource that helps a firm to develop a competitive advantage within the 
political arena and eventually the marketplace (Bonardi, 2011). As for efficacy, firms that invest 
in CSR develop a stronger and more diverse “set of relationships with the community and non-
governmental organizations” (den Hond et al., 2014). Such relationships increase the efficacy of 
these firms when it comes to the political arena and enhance the firm’s influence “in the policy 
process” (den Hond et al., 2014). Lastly, CSR investments can help to reduce the costs associated 
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with a firm’s political activities by lowering the amount of donations that a firm must make to 
politicians (den Hond et al., 2014).  
Thus, firms with a superior CSP are likely to signal to investors that a firm’s lobbying for 
good efforts will be done in a way that does not damage the firm’s superior social performance or 
the benefits that come with it, thereby reducing some of the uncertainty. Therefore, in line with 
signaling theory and RBV literature, the author expects a firm’s engagement in lobbying for good 
to have less of a negative impact on firm performance when a firm has a superior CSP. Hence, the 
author hypothesizes,  
H5: The greater a firm’s corporate social performance, the less negative a firm’s abnormal 
returns surrounding a firm’s effort to lobby for good. 
Institutional Ownership 
 Drawing from signaling theory and agency literature, the author expects that a firm’s level 
of institutional ownership will help to reduce some of the uncertainty associated with lobbying for 
good. Prior research has demonstrated that there is a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and CPA (Hadani, 2012). The reasoning behind this negative relationship is that it’s 
difficult for investors to monitor a firm’s actions (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). This lack of 
monitoring results in “information asymmetries between shareholders and managers, which have 
been associated with moral hazards and increased agency cost” (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). 
However, the level of institutional ownership can help to mitigate some of these asymmetries 
through direct access to management (Schnatterly et al., 2008).  
 For instance, prior literature demonstrates that institutional owners are important when it 
comes to reigning in a manager’s opportunistic behavior (Hoskisson et al., 2002). From an equity 
standpoint, institutional investors are incentivized to take on the costs (Hadani, 2012) associated 
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with monitoring a firm’s actions (Schnatterly et al., 2008) in order to protect their investment (Del 
Guercio & Hawkins, 1999). Monitoring has also been found to lower the agency costs that are 
associated with a firm’s political activities (Schnatterly et al., 2008).  
 Thus, a higher level of institutional ownership is likely to signal to the market that the 
firm’s political activities are being monitored by the institutional investors, thereby, reducing some 
of the uncertainty. Therefore, in line with signaling theory and agency literature, the author expects 
a firm’s engagement in lobbying for good to have less of a negative impact on firm performance 
when the firm has a higher level of institutional ownership. Thus, the author hypothesizes,  
H6: The higher a firm’s level of institutional ownership, the less negative a firm’s 
abnormal returns surrounding a firm’s effort to lobby for good. 
Methodology 
Sample 
To develop the sample, the author used the “SCOTUSblog” website to identify firms that 
are both listed on one of the two main stock exchanges in the United States (e.g., New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ) and are also included on an amicus brief that has been filed with the 
Supreme Court. In accordance with an event study methodology, the author confirmed that firms 
within our sample had no major announcements within the 10-day window surrounding the filing 
of an amicus brief (Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 2004). Such announcements included dividend 
payout, a change in CEO, or corporate restructuring (Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 2004; Kashmiri et 
al., 2017). The final sample for this study consisted of 201 publicly listed U.S. firms over the 
course of a three-year span (2015 to 2017).  
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Event Study Methodology 
The author used an event study methodology (Geyskens et al., 2002; Boyd et al., 2010) to 
calculate the abnormal returns (ARs) for each firm in the sample surrounding the date that an 
amicus brief was filed. Event studies are used to investigate “stock price movements around 
corporate events” (Sorescu et al., 2017). Specifically, the objective of an event study is to examine 
the extent to which an investor earns abnormal stock returns due to an event that results in new 
information. In the present study, the Market Model was used to calculate the ARs: 
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t  
ARi,t = εi,t = Ri,t – E (Ri,t) 
In Eq. 1, Ri,t represents the rate of return (RoR) on the stock price of firm i on day t; Rm,t 
is the average RoR for a benchmark portfolio of market assets for an estimation period that 
proceeds the event; αi is the intercept; and εi,t is the residual of the estimation. As for Eq. 2, ARi,t 
represents the abnormal returns of firm i on day t. In other words, AR is the difference between 
the observed RoR (i.e., Ri,t) and the expected rate of return (e.g., E (Ri,t)). In addition to the ARs, 
the author took into account for information leakage or a delay in the market’s response to new 
information by calculating the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm i: 
 
 Regarding CAR, t = 0 is the date of when an amicus brief is filed. Additionally, since the 
author conducted an event study across different firms, the author also averaged the CARs and 
calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for the entire sample and test to see if 
the CAAR is significantly different from zero by using Patell’s (1976) Z and the Generalized Sign 
tests (Cowan, 1992).  
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Regression Model and Control Variables 
 The author regressed the ARs (%) for each firm in the sample on the proposed explanatory 
variables. The author controlled for a firm’s prior performance, financial leverage, and firm size 
because poorly performing firms, firms with a greater amount of debt on its books, and smaller 
firms may have less of a safety net to fall back on, thus the shareholder punishment will be more 
negative. Additionally, the author controlled for globalization and diversification. Firms with 
higher globalization experience a greater amount of sales outside of the U.S. and these customers 
may not care that a firm enters the political arena, so the firm incurs less of a punishment from 
shareholders. As for diversification, a greater amount diversification is associated with less risk, 
and therefore the filing of an amicus brief will result in less negative abnormal returns. 
Additionally, the author controlled for advertising and whether the filing occurs during an election 
year (e.g., presidential or midterm election). Advertising was controlled for because a firm with 
higher advertising is more well-known to the consumer and the consumer may not like that a firm 
is engaging in political activities.  
Along the same line of reasoning, consumers are more polarized during election years and 
as a result they may not like a firm lobbying through amicus briefs during that time. Lastly, the 
author controlled for the location of a firm’s headquarters. Firms in a typically more liberal state 
(e.g., California) versus a more conservative state (e.g., Texas) might be more inclined to take on 
the risk of being a part of an amicus brief, thus those firms are punished less. 
Data Measures and Sources 
Corporate Governance Measures. Following prior research (e.g., Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2017), 
the author used Execucomp and DEF-14A filings to operationalize a CEO’s equity-to-pay ratio as 
the ratio of a CEO’s stock and option awards (in dollars) to the CEO’s total compensation. As for 
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the level of institutional ownership, the author used the operationalization approach used by 
Hadani (2012). Specifically, using 13-F filings, the author measured each firm’s total institutional 
ownership equity as equity owned by all institutional investors divided by the firm’s market equity. 
Marketing Measures. The author operationalized marketing influence in the TMT by employing 
the approach used by Feng et al. (2015). Specifically, marketing influence was measured using 
five indicators for each firm year: (1) the number of TMT members with marketing titles as a 
proportion of the total number of TMT executives; (2) a dummy variable indicating whether a 
marketing executive was mentioned among the top five most highly compensated TMT members 
in the firm’s proxy statement; (3) the hierarchical level of the highest-level marketing executive in 
the TMT, where president was recorded as 6, executive vice president as 5, senior vice president 
as 4, vice president as 3, other as 2, and no marketing executives as 1; (4) the cumulative 
hierarchical level of all the marketing executives in the firm’s TMT; and (5) the number of 
responsibilities reflected in marketing TMT executives’ job titles. Once these five indicators for 
each firm year were collected, the author combined them using principal component factor 
analysis. Then the author rescaled the saved Bartlett factor score between 0 and 100. This rescaled 
factor score was then used as our measure of a firm’s marketing influence in the TMT for each 
firm-year.  
As for marketing capability, the author operationalized it following the technique presented 
by Dutta et al. (1999). Specifically, marketing capability was measured by modeling a firm’s 
activities as an efficient frontier that relates its marketing investments (i.e., advertising, SG&A, 
and investments in customer relationships) to an optimal attainment of the firm’s objectives (i.e., 
sales). More information about how this variable was measured in Table 4.1 which can be found 
in the Appendices. 
 22 
 
Corporate Activity Measures. Following prior research (e.g., Muller & Kraussl, 2011), the 
author used KLD Analytics Ratings via the KLD database to measure corporate social 
performance. KLD tracks a firm’s social performance across seven categories and provides an 
annual count of each firm’s strengths and concerns. With regards to the present study, the author 
calculated the sum for both the strengths and concerns for the year most prior to the filing of an 
amicus brief and calculated the net CSP (i.e., total strengths minus total concerns).  
Control Variable Measures. Using Compustat, the author measured prior performance as the 
ratio of net income to total assets for each firm-year, financial leverage as the ratio of total debt to 
total equity, and firm size as the natural log of the number of employees. As for globalization and 
diversification, globalization was measured as the ratio of a firm’s sales outside the U.S. and 
diversification was measured using an entropy measure based on two and four-digit-level segment 
sales (Palepu, 1985). The author also used Compustat to measure advertising as a firm’s 
advertising expenditure as a percentage of total assets. The final control variables, election year 
(i.e., presidential or midterm election year) and corporate headquarters will be dummy coded (1 = 
election year). As for corporate headquarters location, the author used information from the 
presidential election most prior to filing of an amicus brief to determine if the state leaned 
Democrat or Republican (1 = Democrat). 
Results 
Effect of Lobbying for Good 
 As shown in Table 1.1a, the author found support for H1, with the results indicating that 
lobbying for good through the filing of an amicus brief led to a loss in shareholder value for those 
U.S. firms listed on the amicus brief. The average abnormal stock return for the sample on the day 
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of the event was negative (AARMarketModel = -.34). This average abnormal return was significant 
according to both the Patell Z-test and the Generalized Z-test (p < .01). In addition to the day of 
the event, the following day was also negative and significant. The results were also robust when 
looking at the Market Adjusted Model (Table 1.1b).  
Table 1.1a Abnormal Returns for Lobbying for Good (Market Model) 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 1.1b Abnormal Returns for Lobbying for Good (Market Adjusted Model) 
 
 
Average daily abnormal return (AAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 0.46 54
-4 0.52 50
-3 4.68*** 64
-2 0.14 51
-1  -0.41 40
0 -2.44** 41
1 -2.34** 42
2 4.24*** 63
3 -3.23*** 44
4 -1.85* 48
5 4.46*** 61
 1.42$
0.29
4.37***
0.71
-2.52**
-2.38**
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
Table 1a Average daily abnormal returns for sample of politically active firms
0.03
0.08
0.43
0.04
0.01
-0.24
-0.18
3.39***
-0.34
-0.20
0.29
0.34
 -2.10*
4.09***
-1.40
-0.41
Average daily abnornal return (AAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 1.04 56
-4 1.11 55
-3 4.69*** 63
-2 0.90 54
-1 0.10 41
0 -2.20* 43
1  1.30$ 38
2 4.85*** 65
3 -1.96* 45
4  -1.49$ 49
5 4.16*** 61
-0.30
 -1.50$
-0.37
3.14***
0.45
0.08
0.02
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
Table 1b Average daily abnormal retuns for sample of politically active firms
1.60$
1.32$
3.57***
1.17
0.06
0.11
-0.16
0.34
0.33
-0.13
-0.22
-2.63**
-2.06*
 -3.47***
4.27***
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$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
As for the CAAR, Table 1.2a shoes that a number of windows are both negative and 
significant. Specifically, the most negative occurring during the [0, +1] window (CAARMarketModel 
= -.54, p < .001). The results were also robust when looking at the Market Adjusted Model (Table 
1.2b). Lastly, adding further support to H1, the Appendices shows an additional event study that 
the author conducted using a different estimation window. 
Table 1.2a Cumulative Returns for Lobbying for Good (Market Model) 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
  
Table 1.2b Cumulative Returns for Lobbying for Good (Market Adjusted Model)  
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Moderating Role of Marketing, Social Responsibility, and Corporate Governance 
 Table 1.3 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in the 
author’s regression model. 
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] -2.44** 41
[-2, 2] -0.36 48
[-1,  1] -3.00** 37
[-1, 0] -2.02* 36
[0, 1] -3.38*** 37
[0, 2] -0.31 49
Table 1b Cumulative returns for sample of politically active firms
CAAR (%) Generalized Z
-0.34
-0.21
-0.54
-0.34
-0.55
-2.38**
-0.41
-3.51***
-3.79***
-3.51***
-0.25 0.01
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] -2.20* 43
[-2, 2] 1.045 49
[-1,  1] -1.97* 40
[-1, 0] -1.49$ 39
[0, 1] -2.48** 37
[0, 2] 0.77 51
Table 2b Cumulative returns for sample of politically active firms
-0.28
Generalized ZCAAR (%)
-3.33***
-3.75***
-2.06*
-0.37
-2.91**
-0.30
-0.02
-0.44
-0.46
-0.13 0.19
 Table  1.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for Lobbying for Good 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
-0.33 1.86 1
2. CEO Compensation 0.53 0.29 0.09 1
14.87 18.04 0.01 0.11 1
78.70 17.42 0.22*** -0.11 0.17** 1
4.91 4.34 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.26*** 1
0.72 0.23 0.09       0.23*** 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 1
0.04 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.17** 0.50***        0.24*** 0.07 1
1.15 4.35 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04   0.12* 1
1.44 0.76   0.18** -0.07   0.14** 0.75***       0.33*** -0.07       0.48*** 0.04 1
0.38 0.24 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.09       0.21*** -0.08       0.29*** -0.01 0.03 1
0.59 0.64 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.29*** 0.33*** -0.05 0.17 0.01       0.42***     0.18** 1
3.87 5.85 0.06     -0.16** 0.19 -0.09 -0.10 0.13 0.09 -0.13 -0.13 0.13   0.16* 1
0.92 0.27 -0.02     -0.15** 0.02 -0.13* 0.12* 0.03 -0.03 -0.06   -0.16**   0.12* 0.07 0.12 1
Table 3    Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
11. Diversification
12. Advertising
13. Corporate Headquarters
1. Abnormal return on day 0 (%)
3. Marketing Influence
4. Marketing Capability
5. Corporate Social Performance
6. Insitutional Ownership
7. Prior Performance
8. Financial Leverage
9. Firm Size
10. Globalization
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As for the results of the OLS regression analysis, with abnormal return on day 0 serving as 
the dependent variable, Table 1.4 summarizes the results of the author’s cross-sectional regression 
analysis. Due to missing data the sample size was reduced from 201 to 99. The results indicate 
 that CEO compensation (i.e., equity-to-pay ratio) is both positive and significant (β = 1.74, p < 
.05), thus there is support for H2. Next, the results show that marketing influence in the TMT is 
significant but in the opposite direction as predicted (β = -.02, p < .05), thus no support for H3. 
Next, with regards to marketing capability, the results are positive (β = .01) but non-significant, 
thus no support for H4. As for corporate social performance, the coefficient was negative (β = -
.03) and non-significant, thus no support for H5. Lastly, the results indicate that institutional 
ownership is both positive and significant (β = 2.07, p < .05), thus showing support for H6. 
The lack of support for the hypotheses related to marketing influence in TMT, marketing 
capability, and corporate social performance could be the result of several things. First and 
foremost, the lack of support might be the result of the sample size being reduced from 202 to 99 
due to missing data, which in turn can lead to low statistical power during an analysis.  
Additionally, the counterintuitive results associated with marketing influence may be due 
to marketers choosing to ignore customer opinions by engaging in politics or taking political 
stances that don’t align with customer opinions in order to benefit themselves or for their own 
ideologies (Tripathi et al., 2002; Arlen & Weiss, 1995; Coates, 2012). Thus, having more of a 
marketing influence means that the firm has more marketers attempting to fulfill their own agendas 
while ignoring the customer. As a result, this leads to a more severe punishment from investors 
because there is concern about how customers will react. At the very least, they may shift their 
support to firms that engage in politics that align with their own beliefs. As for corporate social 
performance, the lack of support might be due to the author having used KLD data that is not up 
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to date. For example, the author used KLD data from 2013 to explain differences in abnormal 
returns that occurred in 2017.  
Table 1.4 OLS Regression with ARs (%) on day 0 for Lobbying for Good 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
As shown in the Appendices, the author performed a series of robustness checks that are 
related to alternate estimation window and additional analyses that deal with (1) alternate measures 
for marketing influence in the TMT, (2) alternative measures for CSP, (3) the issue that is being 
heard by the Supreme Court, (4) sample selection bias, and (5) missing data.  
First, with regards to estimation windows, the results found in Table 1a and 1b are based 
on an estimation window that begins 250 days prior to the event and ends 30 days prior to the 
event. Thus, in order to add further support for H1, the author runs an event study using an 
Corporate Headquarters
0.16 (.36)
0.53 [-2.82, 5.45]
0.85 [-.28, .23]
F(12, 86) = 2.56***
26.3%
Model 1
0.12 [-.01, .11]
0.93 [-1.33, 1.45]
99
Intercept
R2
N (number of firms)
Overall F-Test
Advertising 
0.45 (.85)
0.26 (.49)
-0.02 (.13)
1.32 (2.08)
 2.07 (.86)**
-4.24 (1.43)***
Table 4 Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Coefficients (SE)
-0.03 (0.05)
0.01 (.02)
-0.02 (.01)**
 1.74 (.67)**
P-Value (CI)
0.01 [.41, 3.07]
0.049 [-.04, -.0001]
0.44 [-.02, .05]
0.54 [-.13 .07]
Model with estimation window [-250, -30]
Variables
H2: CEO Compensation
H3: Marketing Influence
H4: Marketing Capability
H5: Corporate Social Performance
0.06 (.70)
0.59 [-.71, 1.23]
0.60 [-1.23, 2.14]
0.67 [-.56, .87]Diversification
Globalization
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
H6: Institutional Ownership
Prior Performance
0.05 (.03)
0.02 [.37, 3.78]
0.004 [-7.09, -1.40]
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estimation window that begins 299 days prior to the event and ends 11 days prior to the event 
(Table 1.5a/b and Table 1.6a/b). Additionally, the author also used the abnormal returns from the 
additional event study as the dependent variable in an additional analysis (Table 1.7). Second, the 
results from using alternate marketing influence and CSP measures. Specifically, the alternate 
measures for marketing influence included Chief Marketing Officer presence (Table 1.8) and the 
five individual factors that were previously discussed (Table 1.9). Third, the author also conducted 
an analysis that included dummy coded variables to represent the issues that the Supreme Court 
cases were dealing with (Table 1.10). Such issues included those related to LGBT rights, 
discrimination, affirmative action, and immigration.  
Fourth, in order to address any concerns related to sample selection bias, the author 
conducted a two-stage Heckman (Heckman, 1979) analysis. The first stage estimated a probit 
selection model in which the dependent variable (i.e., “CPA Firms”) was equal to 1 for firms that 
were included on an amicus brief and 0 for firms that were not included on an amicus brief. The 
selection was modeled in terms of the firm’s prior performance, financial leverage, firm size, and 
advertising intensity. The first stage selection model provided the inverse mills ratio, which was 
included in the second stage as a control variable. The results from the Heckman analysis indicate 
that the p-value for mills lambda was nonsignificant (p = 0.38), thus there is no indication of 
selection bias for this study’s sample (Table 1.11).   
Lastly, the author used two approaches to deal with any missing data including multiple 
imputation and replacing any missing values with zeros (Table 1.12). The results from these 
additional analyses differ from the initial analysis in that there is no support for H6 but there was 
support for H2 and H4.  
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Discussion and Implications 
 Even though the results above were mostly non-significant, they did provide some 
interesting points of discussion. First, the significant negative relationship between a firm’s 
political activities and shareholder wealth suggests that the market reacts negatively to the news 
of a firm’s lobbying for good efforts. Such a result extends CPA literature by demonstrating that a 
firm’s political activity not only has a long-term impact (i.e., policy changes or Tobin’s q) but also 
an impact in the short-term. Additionally, the present study adds to CPA research by exploring the 
effect of a more recent type of political activity that firms are engaging in such as lobbying for 
good. Furthermore, this study extends CPA research by examining a different approach by which 
a firm engages in lobbying. Prior research has primarily focused on lobbying through a firm’s 
lobbying expenditures. Whereas, the present study investigates a firm’s lobbying activities from 
more of a communication of information perspective (i.e., filing an amicus brief).  
 Second, the positive moderating effect of CEO compensation suggests that the negative 
relationship between a firm’s lobbying for good and shareholder wealth is weakened for firms 
whose CEO has a higher equity-to-pay ratio and for firms with a greater amount of institutional 
ownership. Such findings add to existing research on the role that corporate governance plays in 
improving firm performance. Specifically, the author demonstrates that in addition to motivating 
a CEO to take on more risk including engaging in politics, a higher equity-to-pay ratio also helps 
to reduce some of the uncertainty associated with corporate political activity. Furthermore, the 
findings also show that institutional owners not only help to reduce a firm’s amount of political 
activity (Hadani, 2012), but these investors also serve as monitors with regards to corporate 
political activity. Such monitoring allows for institutional investors to reign in opportunistic 
behavior including a firm’s political activities and reduce the uncertainty that comes with it. Thus, 
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a higher CEO equity-to-pay ratio and greater amount of institutional ownership serve as a signaling 
benefit to investors.  
Third, the significant negative moderating effect of marketing influence in the TMT 
suggests that the negative relationship between a firm’s lobbying for good and shareholder wealth 
is strengthened for firms with a greater amount of marketing influence. This finding is 
contradictory to prior research that has demonstrated that marketing influence can help improve 
firm value (Kashmiri et al., 2017). Such findings may be driven by the notion that senior 
management, including those marketers within the TMT, has the firm engage in political activities 
to serve their own personal agenda or needs while ignoring the opinions of their customers. Thus, 
marketing influence in the TMT fails to serve as a signaling benefit for the market.  
In addition to extending several areas of research, the findings also provide implications 
for practitioners. First, since the Supreme Court case of Citizens United vs. Federal Election 
Commission, we have seen an increase in political activity among businesses in the U.S. However, 
the results from the present study suggest that while lobbying for good may appear that firms are 
lobbying for positive change, the market actually reacts negatively to this type of political activity. 
Therefore, firms and its senior management should use caution when deciding whether to enter the 
political arena by conducting some sort of cost benefit analysis. In other words, the firm’s senior 
management should determine if the short-term cost (i.e., negative abnormal returns) that the firm 
may experience will be outweighed by the potential long-term benefits of its political activities.  
Second, the author’s research also provides firms and its board of directors with an action 
they can take to help reduce the uncertainty that comes with a firm’s political activity. For instance, 
the results demonstrate that the negative market reaction in response to a firm’s lobbying for good 
efforts will be reduced when the CEO has a higher equity-to-pay ratio. Therefore, a firm’s board 
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of directors should work to ensure that a large portion of a CEO’s compensation should be stock 
option based in order to align the risk tendencies of the CEO with those of other shareholders.  
Third, the findings provide institutional investors with an action that they can take in order 
to protect their investments in these firms that engage in political activities such as lobbying for 
good. Specifically, based on their access to the firm and its top executives, these types of investors 
can work to monitor a firm’s actions including those related to politics. By monitoring a firm’s 
actions, institutional investors can help to ensure that the firm is not engaging in activities that will 
damage shareholder wealth for all investors. Additionally, monitoring on the part of institutional 
investors can also help them maintain their positive reputation when it comes to their monitoring 
capabilities.  
Lastly, with regards to marketers, the results provide guidance for them when it comes to 
the firm’s political activities. Specifically, the findings indicate that it’s important for marketers to 
ensure that customer opinions are included in the firm’s strategic decisions. Doing so may result 
in a positive reaction on the part of the market when a firm engages in politics because investors 
believe that a firm’s activities are done with the customer in mind.   
Limitations and Future Research 
 The present study has several limitations and offers several directions for future research. 
First, this study’s sample only consists of publicly listed firms. Thus, future research could 
examine the impact of lobbying for good on privately held firms and how it impacts the private 
firm’s sales, customer purchase intentions, etc. Second, the present study focuses solely on 
lobbying for good through the filing of an amicus briefs. So, future research could examine the 
impact of other manners in which a firm can lobbying for good such as contributions made to 
organizations. Additionally, future research could look at companies that try to advance some type 
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of social change via a press release or those who incorporate a politically-related issue into their 
marketing. Fourth, future research might also look at the impact of lobbying for good on other 
firm-related outcomes such as Tobin’s q or customer/brand loyalty. Lastly, future research could 
look at using a different measure for corporate social performance such as using Fortune’s “Most 
Admired Companies” list as a proxy for reputation.  
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III. ESSAY TWO: BOYCOTTS ARE COMING: A LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF 
CONSUMER BOYCOTTS ON COMPETITORS 
 
Introduction 
 
In today’s political landscape, there has been an increase in consumer activism. According 
to a poll conducted by The Washington Post “one in five Americans has participated in some type 
of political rally” (Horst, 2018). Consumer activism has taken on many forms including rallies, 
marches, protests, a ballot box, and social media. One such method that has become increasingly 
more popular among activists in recent years is a consumer boycott directed at businesses 
(Horseman, 2018). According to Friedman (1985) a consumer boycott is an “attempt by one or 
more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from making 
selected purchases in the marketplace”. In other words, a consumer boycott is a “form of anti-
consumption behavior, where boycotters are market activists who forgo the consumption of certain 
products and services because of environmental, political, ethical, or social issues” (Makarem & 
Jae, 2016). The present study focuses on consumer boycotts that occur for political reasons. 
Consumer boycotts have been urged by both organizations and individuals. For instance, Eric 
Bauman, the chairman of the California Democratic Party, urged for consumers to boycott In-N-
Out Burger due to the fast-food chain’s $25,000 donation to the California Republican Party 
(Horseman, 2018; Boxall, 2018). Additionally, the American Family Association urged consumers 
to boycott Ford Motor Co. because the car company was running advertisements in gay 
publications. The urging of consumers to boycott a company has even come from the highest 
political office in the United States. In 2017, President Trump called for a boycott of the news 
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network, CNN (Heavey, 2017).  
Prior research that has investigated consumer boycotts has examined the causes for 
boycotts (Makarem & Jae, 2016), a consumer’s motivations for engaging in a boycott (Balbanis, 
2013), and the outcomes of consumer boycotts (Ettenson & Klein, 2005; King, 2008; Koku, 2012). 
Even with this abundance of prior literature, there is no study to the author’s knowledge, that 
investigates the impact of a consumer boycott on the competitors of the targeted firm or how the 
impact on competitors is weakened or strengthened by certain firm-specific factors. Addressing 
this gap in the literature allows for a fuller understanding of what happens when a consumer 
boycott occurs. Such information would be valuable to both the targeted firms and the competitors. 
Thus, the present study aims to address the following questions: (1) Are consumer boycotts likely 
to increase the shareholder wealth of a targeted firm’s competitor? (2) What are the similarity and 
governance-related boundary conditions under which a competitor will experience a smaller 
increase in shareholder wealth? (3) What are the marketing and social responsibility-related 
boundary conditions under which a competitor will experience a greater increase in shareholder 
wealth?  
The author argues that the announcement of a consumer boycott is likely to increase an 
investor’s expectations that a competitor will experience an increase in shareholder wealth. This 
is due to an increase in other firm-related outcomes such as an increase in sales or market share as 
a result of customers switching from the targeted firm to its competitors. Drawing from the 
accessibility-diagnosticity framework, the author argues that similarities between a targeted firm 
and its competitors regarding size and product market overlap are likely to facilitate negative 
spillover, thereby reducing the competition effect. Additionally, drawing from social network 
theory, the author argues that certain corporate governance-related ties between the targeted firm 
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and its competitors are likely to reduce the competition effect. On the other hand, based on 
signaling theory and resource-based view (RBV) literature, the author argues that certain 
marketing and corporate responsibility-related resources will strengthen the competition effect.  
Figure 2.1 outlines the conceptual framework of the author’s research. The author tests this 
framework using a data set that consists of 241 firms that are the competitors of targeted firms. 
The findings reveal that a consumer boycott resulted in positive abnormal returns for the 
competitors of targeted firms. In other words, the competitors experience a competition effect. 
Additionally, firms with a greater amount of institutional ownership overlap experience a smaller 
positive abnormal return. Lastly, firms with a greater amount of marketing capabilities experience 
a greater positive abnormal return.  
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework of the Link Between Consumer Boycott and 
Shareholder Wealth for Competitors 
 
 
Based on these findings, the author makes several contributions to existing literature. First, the 
author extends consumers boycott and social activism literature by demonstrating the effect of a 
consumer boycott on the shareholder wealth (i.e., stock price) of the competitors of the targeted 
firm. Second, the author extends corporate governance literature by demonstrating how it can 
further diminish firm performance. Specifically, a greater amount of institutional ownership 
overlap between a targeted firm and its competitors reduces the competition effect. Lastly, these 
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findings add to marketing research by showing that marketing capability acts as a signaling benefit 
for competing firms when a consumer boycott occurs.  
Theoretical Framework 
 First developed when examining labor markets, signaling theory (Spence, 1974) aims to 
deal with situations when there is asymmetric information. In a perfect world, the company and its 
stakeholders (e.g., investors, employees, customers, etc.) would have the same information, and 
this problem of asymmetry wouldn’t arise. With regards to consumer boycotts, there is some 
asymmetric information that exists between the stakeholders and the firm. For instance, when a 
firm becomes the target of a consumer boycott, the competitors of the targeted firm have more 
information about whether customers will switch from the targeted firm to them. In order to deal 
with this asymmetric information, firms can provide signals of their own. With regards to the 
present study, these signals include those related to the similarities between the targeted firm and 
the competitor, corporate governance, marketing, and corporate social responsibility.  
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Consumer Boycotts 
  Consumer boycotts have primarily been the focus of marketing and management scholars. 
Consumer boycott research can be broken down into three areas including (1) the causes of 
boycotts, (2) the motivations for engaging in a boycott, and (3) the outcomes of a boycott. First, 
according to Friedman (1999) early boycotts were due to issues with price (Tyran & Engelmann, 
2005). More recent causes for boycotts include environmental issues (Innes, 2006), human rights, 
and corporate strategies (Makarem & Jae, 2016).  
Second, researchers have also investigated the motivations for participating in a boycott 
(John & Klein, 2003; Sen et al., 2001; Balbanis, 2013; Makarem & Jae, 2016). Specifically, 
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researchers have looked at motivations to participate in a boycott from a cost-benefit perspective 
(James, 2010; Klein et al., 2004). Others have investigated motivations from a socio-psychological 
perspective (Farah & Newman, 2010; James, 2010; Lindenmeier et al., 2012; Hoffman & Muller, 
2009).  
Lastly, researchers have examined the outcomes of consumer boycotts. Prior literature has 
demonstrated the negative impact that consumer boycotts have on attitudes and purchase intentions 
(Ettenson & Klein, 2005; Klein et al., 2002), a company’s image (Klein et al., 2004), reputation 
(Garrett, 1987; Putnam & Muck, 1991), and a politician’s willingness to be associated with a firm 
(McDonnell & Werner, 2016). These negative outcomes can then lead to a negative influence on 
a firm’s financial performance (Makarem & Jae, 2016). Additionally, prior research has found that 
a consumer boycott can influence changes in company policies (Davidson et al., 1995), strategic 
responses (Yuksel & Myrteza, 2008), concession to the demands of the boycott (King, 2008), and 
a firm’s social responsibility initiatives (McDonnell & King, 2013). However, previous research 
examining the relationship between a consumer boycott and financial performance has resulted in 
mixed findings (Koku, 2012; Koku et al., 1997).  
Competition Effect: Consumer Boycotts and Firm Performance 
 When a negative event occurs, investors may perceive the event as a systematic risk for the 
entire industry (Zou & Li, 2016). If this is the case, a contagion effect is likely to occur (Feldman 
& Lynch, 1988; Lang & Stulz, 1992). In other words, a crisis is likely to increase investor’s 
expectations that the same thing is happening at “bystander” firms within the same industry 
(Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015). As a result, firms within the same industry as the focal firm 
experience a decrease in shareholder value (Seo et al., 2014). On the other hand, when a crisis 
occurs, investors might perceive the crisis as idiosyncratic or a risk that is unique to the focal firm 
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(Zou & Li, 2016). This idiosyncratic nature may result in a competition effect and lead investors 
to expect an increase in the demand for the products of other firms within the same industry as the 
focal firm (Kashmiri et al., 2017).  
 Prior research that has investigated the competition effect has primarily looked at it from 
the perspective of product recalls (Dowdell et al., 1992; Govindaraj et al., 2004; van Heerde et al., 
2007). For example, a product recall has been found to result in an increase in competitor’s sales 
(van Heerde et al., 2007). Specifically, the recall of Firestone tires by Bridgestone Corporate had 
a positive impact on the market value of competitors within the tire and automobile industry 
because the competitors were substitutes (Govindaraj et al., 2004). A competition effect has also 
occurred in the pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, a recall had a positive impact on the stock 
price of competitors (Dowdell et al., 1992). In addition to the impact on firm performance, 
customers often switch from the firm involved in the crisis to a competitor and in some cases the 
switch becomes permanent (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). So, when a consumer boycott occurs, it may 
signal to investors that a shift on the part of consumers may occur. Specifically, some consumers 
may take part in the boycott and switch from purchasing goods or services from the targeted firm 
to a competitor.  
 Thus, when a consumer boycott occurs, the author expects that investors will view it as an 
idiosyncratic risk and that the boycott will benefit the targeted firm’s competitors. Therefore, a 
consumer boycott will result in positive impact on a competitor’s performance. Hence, the author 
hypothesizes, 
H1: The announcement of a consumer boycott is likely to increase the shareholder value 
of the competitors of the targeted firm.  
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Similarity with Targeted Firm 
The accessibility-diagnosticity framework (Feldman & Lynch’s 1988), as it relates to two 
brands, suggests that if a consumer perceives Firm A is informative (diagnostic) of Firm B, the 
consumer will use their perceptions about observations of Firm A to make inferences about Firm 
B, if the perceptions of both firms are retrieved from the consumer’s memory (accessible) (Roehm 
& Tybout, 2006; Janakiraman et al., 2009). Prior research has extended this framework to look at 
what happens when a negative event occurs and looking at how these negative events spillover to 
competing firms (Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Trump & Newman, 2017; Janakiraman et al., 2009). 
Such research has found that when a negative event occurs the negative perceptions (Janakiraman 
et al., 2009; Trump & Newman, 2017) and attitudes (Roehm & Tybout, 2006) that consumers have 
towards the brand at the center of the controversy will spillover to competing brands and the 
product category as whole. Furthermore, a spillover between brands has also been found to have a 
negative impact on the sales, stock market performance (Borah & Tellis, 2016), and consumers’ 
liking and purchase intentions (Trump & Newman, 2017) for the competing brands. Lastly, a 
spillover is especially prevalent and more likely to occur when the competing brands are more 
similar to brand in trouble (Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Trump & Newman, 2017; Janakiraman et al., 
2009). 
As it relates to the spillover between two firms, prior research has indicated that 
accessibility can be facilitated by similarities with regards to firm size and product market overlap 
which helps to facilitate a transfer of reputation between firms (Kashmiri et al., 2017). First, similar 
sized firms that operate within the same industry are perceived by investors to have similar 
resource allocation patterns and strategies (Cool & Schendel, 1987; Grewel et al., 2013). Second, 
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firms are considered more similar to each other when firms have a greater product market overlap 
(Porac et al., 1989; Reger & Huff, 1993).  
Therefore, in line with the accessibility-diagnosticity framework, the author expects the 
impact of the competition effect to be weakened when the competitor experiences some negative 
spillover as a result of its similarity to the targeted firm with regards to size and product market 
overlap. Hence, the author hypothesizes,  
H2: The greater a competitor’s degree of similarity with a targeted firm with regards to 
(a) firm size and (b) product market overlap, the smaller the increase in the competitor’s 
shareholder value surrounding the announcement of a consumer boycott. 
Corporate Governance-Related Ties with Targeted Firm   
According to social network theory, the social links between individuals who have 
governing responsibilities results in the spread of a firm’s strategic behavior and financial 
outcomes (Haunschild, 1993; Bizjack et al., 2009). Thus, it’s expected that an investor will take 
into account corporate governance-related ties between a targeted firm and a competitor with 
regards to valuation. With regards to the present study, the author considers the impact of two 
specific corporate governance-related links (i.e., director interlocks and institutional ownership 
overlap). Director interlocks is said to occur two different ways: directly or indirectly. However, 
the present study focuses on indirect director interlock due to legality issues. Indirect interlock 
occurs when two firms are linked indirectly by each firm having a director that serves on the board 
of a third firm (Mizruchi, 1996). A director interlock is expected to weaken the competition effect 
between a targeted firm and a competitor for two reason: similar strategic emphasis and director 
effectiveness.   
 First, social network research has indicated that both types of director interlock result in 
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interlocked firms adopting the orientations and values of one another (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991). 
Additionally, director interlock allows for the flow of information, resources, and ideas (Podolny, 
2001). In other words, social network theory suggests that firms connected by director interlock 
share similar evaluations of strategic issues and are more likely to be similar when it comes to 
strategic priorities and the allocation of resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1982; Westphal et al., 
2001). Second, because some of the blame for the boycott partially falls upon a firm’s top 
executives, the effectiveness of a competitor’s director regarding their monitoring and governing 
role is questioned (Farrell & O’Donnell, 2002; Kang, 2008). Thus, following a boycott, an investor 
will use shortcuts or heuristics (Daniel et al., 2002; Johnson & Tellis, 2005) to project a director’s 
lack of monitoring and governing abilities onto a competitor to whom the director has ties with 
(Doosje et al., 1995; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Therefore, the author expects that when a consumer 
boycott occurs, investors are more likely to expect that a competitor with director interlock is more 
likely to experience its own consumer boycott than if the competitor had no director ties.  
 Aside from director interlock, the author also expects institutional ownership ties to play a 
role in the competition effect of a consumer boycott because of the institutional investor’s role as 
a monitor. First, institutional investors have a higher level of ownership and greater access to the 
top executives than individual investors (Carleton et al., 1998). Corporate governance literature 
has demonstrated the importance (Eisenhardt, 1989) and incentives (Schnatterly et al., 2008) for 
why institutional investors should monitor firms. Additionally, managers in an owner-controlled 
firm have less discretion and interact more with equity owners, which should result in a greater 
alliance in interests between management and owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, when a 
negative event occurs, a firm’s management should carry some of blame, thereby reducing the 
reputation of the institutional investors monitoring skills (Massa & Zaldokas, 2012). Furthermore, 
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if there is an overlap of institution investors between multiple firms, then news of a negative event 
could signal to the market that institutional investors are ineffective at monitoring the other firms 
that they have a large equity stake in (Massa & Zaldokas, 2012).  
 Therefore, the author expects that firms with director ties and a greater amount of 
institutional ownership overlap to be more susceptible to a future consumer boycotts due to shared 
values and a lack of monitoring. Thus, in line with social network theory, the author expects the 
impact of the competition effect to be weakened, when the competitor is similar to the targeted 
firm with regards to director interlock and institutional investors. Hence, the author hypothesizes,  
H3: The greater a competitor’s degree of similarity with a targeted firm with regards to 
(a) directors, and (b) institutional ownership overlap, the smaller the increase in the 
competitor’s shareholder value surrounding the announcement of a consumer boycott. 
Advertising 
Aside from persuasion, advertising is used as a tool to increase the public awareness of 
firms and brands (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Additionally, firms with a higher amount of 
advertising will generate greater market awareness and customer recall (Dahlen, 2001). So, when 
it comes to a negative event or scandal such as a consumer boycott, the consumers who take part 
in the boycott will have to figure a new firm to purchase their products and services from going 
forward. So, in order to figure out who this new firm will be, the consumer uses their recall which 
as mentioned earlier is aided by advertising. For example, if Starbucks becomes the target of a 
consumer boycott and the consumer decides to take part in it, they have to figure out where they 
will get their coffee from, either Dunkin or a local coffee shop. As a result of Dunkin’s larger 
amount of advertising, the customer is more aware of them and decides to make Dunkin their new 
go to place for coffee.  
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Thus, a competitor with a greater amount of advertising is likely to signal to investors that 
competitor will benefit from a change in customer preference. Therefore, in accordance with 
signaling theory, the author expects the competition effect to be greater when a firm has a greater 
amount of advertising. Hence, the author hypothesizes, 
H4: The greater the competitor’s advertising, the greater the increase in the competitor’s 
shareholder value surrounding the announcement of a consumer boycott. 
Marketing Influence and Marketing Capabilities 
Firms that are perceived by investors to have superior crisis management abilities are likely 
to enjoy a greater competition effect following a consumer boycott. Unfortunately, assessing a 
firm’s crisis management skills is not easy for investors to do (Xiong & Bharadwaj, 2013). 
Therefore, in accordance with signaling theory and RBV literature, the author investigates the role 
of two firm-specific marketing related factors that will help to reduce the asymmetry of 
information that comes with a consumer boycott.  
Marketing Influence in the Top Management Team 
First, the author expects that a competitor’s marketing influence in the TMT to play an 
important role in an investor’s assessment of the firm’s crisis management skills. Firms with a 
greater marketing influence pay more attention to customer opinions and act as the voice for the 
customer (Brown et al., 2005; Kerin, 2005). Additionally, when a firm has a greater amount of 
marketing influence, the firm understands the importance of needing to protect both brand and 
customer equity (McGovern & Quelch, 2004), while considering consumer insights when 
developing strategic options (Kerin, 2005). Thus, a competitor with a strong marketing influence 
in its TMT is likely to signal to investors that a competitor will be more customer focused and will 
avoid decisions that result in a consumer boycott. Furthermore, if a competitor with a strong 
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marketing influence becomes the target of a future consumer boycott, the firm possesses the crisis 
management skills and experience to deal with the boycott in an appropriate manner. As a result, 
the competition effect will be strengthened for a competitor with a greater marketing influence. 
Marketing Capability 
 According to RBV literature, a firm’s marketing capability can be defined as a firm-
specific resource because it provides a firm with a competitive advantage due to its rarity, 
inimitability, and sustainability (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Song et al. 2007; Murray et al., 
2011; Capron & Hulland 1999; Kozlenkova et al. 2014). Prior research defines marketing 
capability as the process by which firms use both their tangible and intangible resources to gather 
an understanding of the specific and complex needs of the consumer (Day, 1994; Blesa & Ripolles, 
2008). In other words, marketing capability represents a firm’s marketing knowledge about 
customer needs, along with a firm’s experience of forecasting and responding to those needs (Day, 
1994). 
Strong marketing capabilities has been found to have an impact on crisis management 
capabilities. For instance, stronger marketing capabilities allows firms to better identify customer 
needs, reduce the amount of negative word-of-mouth, and lower the cost of crisis response (Xiong 
& Bharadwah, 2013). Additionally, stronger marketing capabilities also has a positive impact on 
customer satisfaction and loyalty (Angulo-Ruiz et al., 2014; Hooley et al., 2005; Rapp et al., 2010; 
Trainor et al. 2014; Hoch & Deighton, 1989). This in turn should lead to increased future business 
performance (Morgan & Rego, 2006).   
Thus, a firm with a strong marketing influence and marketing capabilities is likely to signal 
to investors that because of its focus on the customer, the firm will avoid decisions that can result 
in it being the target of a boycott in the future. Additionally, if a competitor becomes the target of 
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a boycott, the firm will take the necessary steps to deal with it in an effective and cost-efficient 
manner. Lastly, competitors with a stronger marketing influence and marketing capabilities can 
better leverage the mistake made by the targeted firm’s boycott. For instance, the competitor could 
create and run advertisements that further tarnish the targeted firm while also reassuring its 
customers that it will not make the same mistake as the targeted firm. Therefore, in line with 
signaling theory and RBV literature, the author expects the competition effect to be greater for a 
competitor with a greater marketing influence and marketing capabilities. Hence, the author 
hypothesizes, 
H5: The greater the competitor’s (a) marketing influence in the TMT and (b) marketing 
capability, the greater the increase in the competitor’s shareholder value surrounding the 
announcement of a consumer boycott. 
Corporate Social Performance 
Drawing from signaling theory, and RBV and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
literature, the author also expects that a firm’s corporate social performance (CSP) will help 
increase the competition effect that a competitor experiences following a consumer boycott. CSR 
is defined as the “social responsibility of a business that encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary expectations that society has for organizations” (Carroll, 1979). Prior research 
has used RBV to argue that a “firm’s commitment to CSR allows it to develop a valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable resource in the form of superior corporate reputation” (Kashmiri 
et al., 2017). A superior reputation offers several benefits to a firm such as long-term customer 
loyalty (Maignan & Ferrell, 2004; Peloza & Shang, 2011; Lacey et al., 2015), and superior 
financial performance (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011).   
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Additionally, the development of a superior social performance can help a firm develop a 
“positive moral capital” that offers an insurance-like protection when a negative event occurs 
(Godfrey, 2005). These benefits that are associated with a superior social performance provides a 
firm with the motivation to avoid risky or negative activities that would damage it. In addition to 
avoiding negative events, a superior CSP will also incentivize a firm to handle a negative event or 
crisis in a swift and appropriate manner. 
Thus, a competitor’s superior CSP is likely to signal to investors that the firm will avoid 
decisions that can result in a consumer boycott in order to protect its superior social performance 
and the benefits that come with it. Additionally, if a competitor becomes the target of a boycott in 
the future, the firm will be shielded from the negative consequences of the boycott and that the 
firm will deal with the boycott in way that minimizes the damage to its social performance. 
Therefore, in line with signaling theory and RBV literature, the author expects the competition 
effect to be greater for a competitor with a superior CSP. Hence, the author hypothesizes, 
H6: The greater the competitor’s corporate social performance, the greater the increase 
in the competitor’s shareholder value surrounding the announcement of a consumer 
boycott. 
Methodology 
Sample 
To develop the sample, the author used LexisNexis and Ethical Consumer to identify firms 
that are both listed on one of the two main stock exchanges in the United States (e.g., New York 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ) and have been the target of a consumer boycott for a political 
reason. Some examples of a consumer boycott due to a political reasons include boycotting 
companies because their support of Planned Parenthood or their support for a political candidate. 
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Then using proxy statements, the author was able to put together a sample that consisted of 
competitors of the boycotted firms. Additionally, in accordance with an event study methodology, 
the author confirmed that firms within the sample have no major announcements within the 10-
day window surrounding the announcement of a consumer boycott (Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 
2004). Such announcements included dividend payout, a change in CEO, or corporate restructuring 
(Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 2004; Kashmiri et al., 2017). The final sample consisted of 241 publicly 
traded U.S. firms in the year 2017.  
Event Study Methodology 
The author used an event study methodology (Geyskens et al., 2002; Boyd et al., 2010; 
Kashmiri et al., 2017) to calculate the abnormal returns (ARs) for each of the firms in the sample 
surrounding the date a consumer boycott announcement. Event studies are used to investigate 
“stock price movements around corporate events” (Sorescu et al., 2017). Specifically, the objective 
of an event study is to examine the extent to which an investor earns abnormal stock returns due 
to an event that results in new information. In the present study, the Market Model was used to 
calculate the ARs: 
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t  
ARi,t = εi,t = Ri,t – E (Ri,t) 
In Eq. 1, Ri,t represents the rate of return (RoR) on the stock price of firm i on day t; Rm,t 
is the average RoR for a benchmark portfolio of market assets for an estimation period that 
proceeds the event; αi is the intercept; and εi,t is the residual of the estimation. As for Eq. 2, ARi,t 
represents the abnormal returns of firm i on day t. In other words, AR is the difference between 
the observed RoR (i.e., Ri,t) and the expected rate of return (e.g., E (Ri,t)). In addition to the ARs, 
the author will also adjust for information leakage or a delay in market response to new information 
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by calculating the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm i: 
 
 With regards to CAR, t = 0 is the date of when a boycott is announced. Additionally, since 
the author conducted an event study across different firms, the author also averaged the CARs and 
calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for the entire sample to see if the 
CAAR is significantly different from zero by using Patell’s (1976) Z and the Generalized Sign 
tests (Cowan, 1992).  
Regression Model and Control Variables 
 The author regressed the ARs (%) for each firm in the sample on the proposed explanatory 
variables. The author controlled for a firm’s prior performance in order to make sure that any other 
positive news that can impact a firm’s stock price is accounted for. Globalization and 
diversification were also controlled for. Firms with higher globalization experience a greater 
amount of sales outside of the U.S. and these customers may not care about a boycott or the impact 
of it on competing firm thus the firm experiences more positive abnormal returns. As for 
diversification, a greater amount diversification is associated with less risk, and therefore the 
announcement of a consumer boycott will result in more positive abnormal returns. Lastly, the 
authors controlled for a competing firm’s prior corporate political activity because a firm with 
higher political activity might be more susceptible to a future consumer boycott, thus the firm will 
be experience less positive abnormal returns.  
Data Measures and Sources 
Similarity Measures: The author operationalized the similarity measures by employing the 
approach used by Kashmiri et al. (2017). Specifically, firm size was measured as the natural log 
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of the firm’s employees for each firm-year. As for a competitor’s product market overlap with a 
targeted firm, the author dummy coded the variable (1 = a competitor with the same four-digit SIC 
code).  
Corporate Governance Measures: As for the corporate governance variables, the author 
followed Kashmiri et al. (2017) approach. Specifically, the author operationalized director 
interlock using both Risk Metrics and proxy filings. The variable was dummy coded (1 = if the 
firm had an indirect director interlock with the targeted firm). As for institutional ownership 
overlap, it was measured using Thomson Reuter’s Institutional Holdings as the proportion of the 
competitor’s shares held by institutions that also held shares of the targeted firms. 
Marketing Measures: Both marketing influence and marketing capabilities were consistent with 
how they were measured in essay one. Specifically, the author operationalized marketing influence 
in the TMT by employing the approach used by Feng et al. (2015). Specifically, the five indicators 
for each firm year include: (1) the number of TMT members with marketing titles as a proportion 
of the total number of TMT executives; (2) a dummy variable indicating whether a marketing 
executive was mentioned among the top five most highly compensated TMT members in the firm’s 
proxy statement; (3) the hierarchical level of the highest-level marketing executive in the TMT, 
where president was recorded as 6, executive vice president as 5, senior vice president as 4, vice 
president as 3, other as 2, and no marketing executives as 1; (4) the cumulative hierarchical level 
of all the marketing executives in the firm’s TMT; and (5) the number of responsibilities reflected 
in marketing TMT executives’ job titles. Once these five indicators for each firm year are collected, 
they were combined using principal component factor analysis. The author then rescaled the saved 
Bartlett factor score between 0 and 100. This rescaled factor score was then used as our measure 
of a firm’s marketing influence in the TMT in each firm-year. 
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 As for marketing capability, the author measured it following the technique presented by 
Dutta et al. (1999). Specifically, marketing capability measured by modeling a firm’s activities as 
an efficient frontier that relates its marketing investments (i.e., advertising, SG&A, and 
investments in customer relationships) to an optimal attainment of the firm’s objectives (i.e., sales). 
Lastly, advertising was operationalized by converting a firm’s advertising expenditures as a 
percentage of a firm’s total assets (Kashmiri et al., 2017).  
Corporate Activity Measures: Following prior research (e.g., Muller & Kraussl, 2011), the 
author used KLD Analytics Ratings via the KLD database to measure corporate social 
performance. KLD tracks a firm’s social performance across seven categories and provides an 
annual count of each firm’s strengths and concerns. Regarding the present study, the author 
calculated the sum for both the strengths and concerns for the year most prior the announcement 
of consumer boycott and calculated the net CSP (i.e., strengths minus concerns).  
Control Variable Measures: Using Compustat, the author measured prior performance as the 
ratio of net income to total assets for each firm-year. As for globalization, it was measured as the 
ratio of a firm’s sales outside the U.S. and diversification was measured using an entropy measure 
based on two and four-digit-level segment sales (Palepu, 1985). Lastly, in accordance with prior 
research (e.g., Coates, 2012) the author operationalized a firm’s political activity by including both 
a firm’s lobbying expenditures and contributions. These amounts were gathered from “Open 
Secrets” website, which summarizes data from Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the U.S. 
Senate. 
Results 
Effect of a Consumer Boycott on Competitors 
 As shown in Table 2.1a, the author found support for H1, with the results indicating that a 
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consumer boycott led to a gain in shareholder value for the competitors of the boycotted firms. 
The average abnormal stock return for the sample on the day of the event was positive 
(AARMarketModel = .64). This average abnormal return was significant according to both the Patell 
Z-test and the Generalized Z-test (p < .001). In addition to the day of the event, the following day 
was also positive and significant. The results were also robust when looking at the results 
associated with the Market Adjusted Model (Table 2.1b).  
Table 2.1a Abnormal Returns for Competitors (Market Model) 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 2.1b Abnormal Returns for Competitors (Market Adjusted Model) 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Average daily abnornal return (AAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 -1.568$ 47
-4 2.650** 68
-3 -3.054** 43
-2 1.075 49
-1 -3.764*** 47
0 6.550*** 78
1 0.974 58
2 -3.145*** 37
3 -1.900* 39
4 2.710** 62
5 -1.465$ 44-0.20 -1.945*
-0.20 -3.620***
0.19 3.723***
0.05 2.306*
-0.17 -4.264***
-0.52 -0.915
0.64 8.619***
-0.18 -0.915
0.21 5.398***
Table 1a Average daily abnormal retuns for sample of competing firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
-0.37 -2.332**
0.05 -0.399
Average daily abnornal return (AAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 -0.049 53
-4 2.483** 63
-3 -1.381$ 42
-2 1.083 48
-1 -6.108*** 37
0 9.877*** 85
1 0.308 53
2 -1.498$ 44
3 -3.042** 37
4 1.461$ 55
5 -2.872** 36-0.29 -3.758***
-0.28 -3.371***
0.08 2.043*
-0.02 1.399$
-0.08 -1.179
-0.68 -3.500***
0.87 11.325***
-0.148
-0.08 1.399$
0.17 4.622***
Table 2a Average daily abnormal retuns for sample of competing firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
-0.29 -1.824*
0.05
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As for the CAAR, Table 2.2a shows that a number of windows are both positive and significant. 
Specifically, the most positive occurring during the [0, +1] window (CAARMarketModel = .69, p < 
.001). The results were robust when looking at the Market Adjusted Model (Table 2.2b). Lastly, 
adding further support to H1, the Appendices shows the results from additional event study that 
was based on a different estimation window. 
Table 2.2a Cumulative Returns for Competitors (Market Model) 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 2.2b Cumulative Returns for Competitors (Market Adjusted Model)  
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Moderating Role of Similarity Factors, Corporate Governance, Marketing and CSR Factors 
Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in the 
author’s regression model.  
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] 6.551*** 78
[-2, 2] 0.757 51
[-1,  1] 2.172* 64
[-1, 0] 1.971* 63
[0, 1] 5.321*** 71
[0, 2] 2.529** 600.52 3.079**
0.12 3.851***
0.69 6.558***
0.05 0.116
0.17 4.239***
CAAR (%) Generalized Z
0.64 8.619***
Table 1b Cumulative returns for sample of competing firms
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] 9.877*** 85
[-2, 2] 1.638$ 57
[-1,  1] 2.354** 66
[-1, 0] 2.665** 66
[0, 1] 7.202*** 81
[0, 2] 5.016*** 700.77 6.813***
0.20 5.653***
0.85 10.294***
0.14 2.817**
0.17 5.524***
CAAR (%) Generalized Z
0.87 11.325***
Table 2b Cumulative returns for sample of competing firms
 Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for Competitors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% Positive 0.64 1.73 1
1.83 0.50 0.02 1
0.10 0.31 0.05 -0.05 1
0.22 0.41 -0.09 0.14** 0.02 1
0.50 0.23 -0.24*** 0.13** -0.09 0.07 1
4.71 4.93 0.04 -0.23*** -0.10 0.10 -0.09 1
27.87 25.91 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.21*** 1
36.77 18.41 -0.02 0.65*** -0.03 0.08 0.15** -0.31*** 0.02 1
5.33 4.23 -0.02 0.06 -0.11* 0.03 0.26*** 0.03 0.15** -0.05 1
0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.11* 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.25*** 0.05 -0.17*** 0.08 1
0.42 0.26 0.01 -0.13** -0.07 0.13** 0.10 0.15** 0 -0.28*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 1
0.62 0.60 -0.09 0.10 -0.13** 0.25*** 0.10 0.15** 0.11 -0.13* 0.34*** 0.01 0.36*** 1
3.48 0.63 -0.19*** 0.43*** -0.06 0.24*** 0.21*** -0.28*** 0.06 0.31*** 0.11 -0.09 0.19*** 0.29*** 1
2.54 0.86 -0.18*** 0.46*** -0.09 0.24*** 0.22*** -0.16** 0 0.34*** 0.27*** -0.07 0.07 0.28*** 0.63*** 1
11. Globalization
12. Diversification
13. Lobbying
14. Contributions
5. Institutional Ownership Overlap
6. Advertising Intensity
7. Marketing Influence
8. Marketing Capability
9. Corporate Social Performance
10. Prior Performance
Table 3    Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients
13 14
1. Abnormal return on day 0 (%)
2. Firm Size
3. Product Overlap
4. Director Interlock
7 8 9 10 11 12Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
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As for the results of the OLS regression analysis, with abnormal return on day 0 serving as the 
dependent variable, Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the author’s cross-sectional regression 
analysis. Due to missing data the sample size was reduced from 241 to 95. Specifically, the results 
indicate that the coefficient for firm size and product market overlap were negative and positive, 
respectively (β = -.47 and 0.59) but not significant, thus no support for H2a and H2b. As for the 
corporate governance-related measures, the results show that director interlock was positive (β = 
.07) and non-significant, thus no support for H3a. On the other hand, institutional ownership 
overlap is negative and significant (β = -2.12, p < .05), thus there is support for H3b. The results 
also show that advertising intensity and marketing influence in the TMT were positive and 
negative, respectively (β = .03 and -.01) but non-significant, thus no support for H4 or H5a. But, 
marketing capability was both positive and significant (β = .04, p < .10), thus there is support for 
H5b. Lastly, the coefficient for corporate social performance was positive (β = .12) but non-
significant, thus no support for H6.  
The lack of support for those hypotheses related to firm size, product market overlap, 
director interlock, advertising intensity, marketing influence, and corporate social performance 
may be result of several things. First and foremost, the lack of support might be the result of the 
sample size being reduced from 241 to 95 due to missing data, which may result in low statistical 
power during an analysis. Specifically, the lack of support for the hypothesis related to corporate 
social performance might be related to the author having to use KLD data that is not up to date. 
For example, the author was using KLD data from 2013 to explain differences in abnormal returns 
that occurred in 2017.  
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Table 2.4 OLS Regression with ARs (%) on day 0 for Competitors 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
As shown in the Appendices, the author performed a series of robustness checks and 
additional analyses that deal with (1) an alternate estimation window, (2) alternate measures for 
marketing influence in the TMT, (3) alternative measures for CSP, (4) dummy coded variables 
that are related to the political-based reason behind the call for a consumer boycott, and (5) missing 
data.  
First, with regards to estimation windows, the results found in Table 2.1a and 2.1b are 
based on the estimation window that begins 250 days prior to the event and ends 30 days prior to 
H6: Corporate Social Performance
F(13, 48) = 4.94***
95
17.2%
Table 4    Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Model with estimation window [-250, -30]
Model 1
H2a: Firm Size
H4: Advertising Intensity
H2b: Product Market Overlap
H3a: Director Interlock
H3b: Institutional Ownership Overlap
Intercept
H5a: Marketing Influence
H5b: Marketing Capability
Diversification
Lobbying
Contributions
Prior Performance
Globalization
Variables
-0.01 (.36)
-0.59 (.34)*
-0.59 (.31)
3.79 (2.00)*
0.70 (1.11)
-0.42 (3.56)
0.12 (.11)
Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
R2
N (number of firms)
Overall F-Test
0.04 (.02)**
-0.01 (.01)
0.03 (.04)
-2.12 (.84)**
0.07 (.59)
0.59 (.37)
-0.47 (.69) 0.499 [-1.85, .92]
0.11 [-.14, 1.33]
0.90 [-1.11, 1.26]
0.02 [-3.81, -.43]
0.45 [-.05, .11]
0.31 [-.03, .01]
0.03 [.003, .07]
0.29 [-.10, .34]
0.91 [-7.57, 6.74]
0.53 [-1.53, 2.92]
0.97 [-.74, .71]
0.09 [-1.28, .10]
0.13 [-1.12, .14]
0.06 [-.23, 7.81]
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the event. Thus, in order to add further support for H1, the author runs an event study using an 
estimation window that begins 299 days prior to the event and ends 11 days prior to the event. 
Additionally, the author also used these abnormal returns from the additional event study as the 
dependent variable in an additional analysis (Table 2.7). Second, the results from using alternate 
marketing influence and CSP measures. Specifically, the alternate measures for marketing 
influence included Chief Marketing Officer presence (Table 2.8) and the five individual factors 
that were previously discussed (Table 2.9).  
Third, the author also ran an analysis that included dummy coded variables to represent the 
political issues that resulted in a consumer boycott (Table 2.10). Such issues, included those related 
to anti-conservative, domestic policy, LGBT rights, foreign policy, gun rights, abortion, anti-war, 
and pro-democrat. Lastly, the author used two approaches to deal with any missing data including 
multiple imputation and replacing any missing values with zeros (Table 2.11). With regards to the 
analysis that used multiple imputation, the results differ in that there is no support for H3b but 
there is support for H4. As for replacing missing values with zero, the results remained consistent.   
Discussion and Implications 
Even though the results above were mostly non-significant, they did provide some 
interesting points that are worth discussing. First, the significant positive relationship between a 
consumer boycott and the shareholder wealth for the competitors of the targeted firms, suggests 
that investors react positively to the news of a consumer boycott for competing firms. In other 
words, the competitors experience a competition effect when a consumer boycott occurs.Such 
results extend consumer boycott and social activism literature by demonstrating that a consumer 
boycott not only has an impact on the targeted firms but they can also have an impact on the 
competitors of the targeted firm.  
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Second, the negative moderating effect of institutional ownership overlap suggests that the 
positive relationship between a consumer boycott and competitor’s shareholder wealth is 
weakened for those competitors with a greater amount of institutional ownership overlap with the 
targeted firm. Such a finding adds to existing research on the role that corporate governance plays 
when it comes to a decrease in firm performance. Specifically, the author provides further evidence 
that negative events, such as a consumer boycott, can reduce the reputation of institutional 
investors as it relates to their monitoring capabilities. Additionally, the results from the present 
study also show that due to a transfer of reputation, not only is an institutional investor’s 
investment in the controversial firm damaged but also any other firms those investors hold shares 
in.   
Third, the significant positive moderating effect of marketing capabilities suggests that the 
positive relationship between a consumer boycott and competitor’s shareholder wealth is 
strengthened for firms with a greater amount of marketing capabilities. Such a result extends 
existing literature on the role that marketing plays as it relates to improving firm performance. 
Specifically, the results demonstrate that in the event of a consumer boycott, those competitors 
with superior marketing capabilities have a better ability to capitalize on the targeted firm’s 
mistake. For instance, these competitors will be able to assure their customers that they will avoid 
being the target of a consumer boycott while also developing advertisements to further bring down 
the targeted firm. 
In addition to extending several areas of research, the findings also provide implications 
for practitioners. First, the findings provide institutional investors with an action that they can take 
in order to make sure that their large equity stake in a firm is safe. Specifically, due to their access 
to a firm and its top executives, these investors have the job of monitoring a firm’s actions. 
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Through the monitoring of a firm’s actions, institutional investors can help to ensure that the firms 
they are heavily invested in are not engaging in activities that could possibly damage shareholder 
wealth for investors. Additionally, the results from the present study demonstrate that institutional 
investor monitoring is also important when it comes to reputation. If the monitoring capabilities 
of institutional investors are seen as questionable, the transfer of a poor reputation has the ability 
to negatively impact all the companies these investors have large equity stakes in.  
Second, consumer boycotts are becoming a frequent tool for activists to use to accomplish 
their goals. Therefore, the results from the present study provide a competing firm’s senior 
management, including those marketers within the TMT, with an action that they can take in order 
to improve the competition effect the firm experiences when a consumer boycott occurs. 
Specifically, a firm’s senior management can invest in having strong marketing capabilities. Due 
to the customer knowledge that comes with investing in strong marketing capabilities, a firm can 
be better equipped to avoid negative events such as a consumer boycott. Lastly, investing in strong 
marketing capabilities can help a firm if it ever finds itself at the center of a negative event like a 
consumer boycott. Those strong marketing capabilities that senior management made the decision 
to invest will help the firm handle the negative event in a swift and appropriate manner.   
Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has several limitations and offers several directions for future research. 
First, there may be some concern with sample selection bias due to the non-random nature in which 
firms were included in the sample that is used in the present study. Second, this study’s sample 
only consists of publicly listed firms. Thus, future research could examine the impact of consumer 
boycott on privately held firms, both the targeted firms and its competitors, from a performance 
perspective by looking at how a boycott impacts the private firm’s sales, customer purchase 
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intentions, etc. Second, the present study focuses solely on consumer boycotts due to political 
reasons. So, future research could examine consumer boycotts for non-political reasons such as 
using non-union actors in commercials. Third, future research might also look at other firm-related 
outcome for competing brands such as Tobin’s q or customer/brand loyalty. Lastly, future research 
could look at using a different measure for corporate social performance. For instance, future 
research could use Fortune’s “Most Admired Companies” as a proxy for CSP.  
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IV. ESSAY THREE: LIVE LONG AND DON’T PROSPER: THE IMPACT OF A 
CONSUMER BOYCOTT ON LONG-TERM FIRM VALUE 
 
Introduction 
 
In early 2017, Starbucks came under fire for its pledge to hire 10,000 refugees in response 
to President Trump’s executive order that would deny entry of “refugees from several 
predominately Muslim countries” (Kell, 2017). Specifically, in a statement released by the CEO 
of Starbucks, Howard Schulz, the firm discusses how it will work to hire 10,000 refugees over a 
five-year span (Starbucks, 2017). Below is an excerpt from Schulz’s statement regarding this 
matter:  
There are more than 65 million citizens of the world recognized as refugees by the 
United Nations, and we are developing plans to hire 10,000 of them over five years 
in the 75 countries around the world where Starbucks does business.  And we will 
start this effort here in the U.S. by making the initial focus of our hiring efforts on 
those individuals who have served with U.S. troops as interpreters and support 
personnel in the various countries where our military has asked for such support. 
 
Starbucks is no stranger to controversy and the firm’s notion of hiring refugees is just another 
example. Following the release of the statement, individuals took to Twitter to express their 
opinions about Starbucks plans. Those in disagreement with Starbucks often included the hashtag, 
#BoycottStarbucks in their social media posts.  
 Calls for consumer boycotts have become an increasingly popular form of social activism 
for consumers to express their displeasure with or disapproval of a firm’s activities. A consumer 
boycott is an “attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual 
consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace” (Friedman, 1985). In 
other words, an individual or organization is trying to get consumers to engage in anti-consumption 
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behavior by forgoing the consumption of certain products or services because of issues dealing 
with the environment, politics, ethics, or society (Chatzidakis and Lee 2013; Hoffmann 2011; 
Yuksel 2013; Yuksel and Mryteza 2009). The present study focuses on consumer boycotts for 
political reasons. In other words, the consumer boycott is a response a firm taking a political stance 
such as its support of Planned Parenthood or for supporting a political candidate. Aside from the 
call to boycott Starbucks, other examples include boycotting The Walt Disney Company for 
pushing an LGBT agenda or Nike for using Colin Kaepernick as its spokesperson for its “Just Do 
It” campaign.   
With regards to consumer boycotts, prior literature has examined them from several aspects 
including the causes of boycotts (Makaram & Jae, 2016), the motivation behind joining and 
engaging in a boycott (Balbanis, 2013), and the outcomes of consumer boycotts (Ettenson & Klein, 
2005). With regards to consumer boycotts, most of the research has focused on more of a short-
term perspective, while very little research has focused on consumer boycotts from a long-term 
perspective. Such research would provide an indication of whether these consumer boycotts are 
just small obstacles that firms have to get past and don’t have to worry too much about or if they 
are something that firms need to be concerned about because of the potential long-term damage. 
Additionally, prior research has failed to take into account the role of marketing and a firm’s prior 
political activities as it relates to consumer boycotts. Due to the lack of research in this area, the 
author will address the following questions: (1) Are consumer boycotts likely to decrease the long-
term firm value of a targeted firm? (2) If so, what are the politics-related boundary conditions 
under which a targeted firm will experience a greater decrease in long-term firm value? (3) What 
are the top management-related boundary conditions under which a targeted firm will experience  
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a smaller decrease in long-term firm value? (4) What marketing-related resources mediate the 
effect of the top management characteristic on long-term firm value? 
The author argues that the announcement of a consumer boycott is likely to result in the 
targeted firm experiencing a decrease in long-term firm value. Drawing from prior CPA research, 
the author argues that certain politics-related factors will strengthen the negative long-term effect 
of a boycott. Additionally, drawing from upper-echelon literature, the author argues that a certain 
top management characteristic weakens the negative long-term effect of a boycott. Lastly, based 
on resource-based view (RBV) and upper-echelon literature, the author argues that a certain top 
management characteristic will result in greater marketing-related resources which are likely to 
reduce the negative long-term effect of a boycott.  
Figure 3.1 outlines the conceptual framework of the author’s research and Figure 3.2 
outlines how the conceptual model would be empirically tested. The author tests this framework 
using a data set that consists of 145 firms that are the target of consumer boycott. The findings 
reveal that a consumer boycott resulted in negative buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Additionally, 
the findings indicate that a firm’s prior political activities and the background of the CEO do not 
moderate the relationship between a consumer boycott and a firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns. Lastly, the impact of the CEO’s background on this relationship between a boycott and 
performance is not mediated by either marketing capabilities or marketing influence in the TMT.
 Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework of the Link Between Consumer Boycott and Long-Term Firm Value for Targeted Firms 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Empirical Framework of the Link Between Consumer Boycott and Long-Term Firm Value for Targeted Firms 
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Based on these findings, the author makes several contributions to existing literature. First, the 
author contributes to consumer boycott and social activism literature by empirically demonstrating 
the negative effect that a consumer boycott has on long-term firm value (i.e., buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns) for the targeted firms. Second, the author extends corporate political activity 
literature by demonstrating that a firm’s prior political activities fail to signal that a firm will 
experience a decline in reputation within the political community, which in turn further diminishes 
long-term firm performance. Third, the findings add to marketing literature by showing that a CEO 
with a marketing background does not help to reduce the long-term negative consequences of a 
consumer boycott. Lastly, the findings further extend marketing literature by demonstrating that 
having a CEO with a marketing background does not mean that the firm will have more of a 
marketing influence in the TMT or place a greater emphasis on marketing capabilities.   
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Consumer Boycotts and Firm Performance 
Research investigating consumer boycotts has primarily been the focus of marketing and 
management researchers. The research conducted on consumer boycotts can be divided into three 
main areas including (1) the causes of boycotts, (2) motivations behind consumer engagement in 
a boycott, and (3) the outcomes of consumer boycotts.   
From an outcome perspective, prior research has demonstrated mixed results with regards 
to the impact of a consumer boycott on firm performance (Koku, 2012; Koku et al., 1997). 
However, several studies have demonstrated that consumer boycotts are negatively related to firm 
performance. For example, it was found that targeted companies experience negative returns 
(Pruitt & Friedman, 1986), a decline in stock price (Pruitt et al., 1988; Davidson et al., 1995; King, 
2011), and a drastic drop in annual sales (Ettenson et al., 2006). 
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Aside from a negative impact on firm performance, a consumer boycott has also been found 
to have a negative impact on several other firm-related outcomes. Specifically, prior literature has 
shown that consumer boycotts have a negative impact on attitudes and purchase intentions 
(Ettenson & Klein, 2005; Klein et al., 2002), a company’s image (Klein et al., 2004), reputation 
(Garrett, 1987; Putnam & Muck, 1991), and a politician’s willingness to associate with a firm 
(McDonnell & Werner, 2016). Each of these negative outcomes could in turn adversely affect a 
firm’s financial performance.  
Therefore, in addition to having a direct negative impact on a firm’s financial performance, 
a consumer boycott can also have a negative influence on other outcomes, which can then 
negatively impact financial performance. As a result, the author expects that a consumer boycott 
will result in a negative impact on long-term firm value. Hence, the author hypothesizes, 
H1: The announcement of a consumer boycott is likely to decrease the long-term firm value 
of the targeted firms. 
Corporate Political Activity 
Drawing from CPA literature, the author expects a firm’s political activity to strengthen 
the negative effect of a consumer boycott. CPA is defined as a firm’s effort to “shape government 
policy in ways favorable to the firm” (Hillman et al. 2004). Prior research that has investigated the 
intersection between activism and CPA has shown that an activist’s efforts serve as signals for 
how stakeholders perceive an organization (e.g., a firm) (McDonnell & Werner, 2016) with regards 
to its reputation (King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013). Such signals are useful to politicians 
(McDonnell & Werner, 2016), investors (King & Soule, 2007), analysts (Vasi & King, 2012), and 
the targeted organizations themselves (Ingram et al., 2010).  
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Specifically, from a political perspective, prior research has found that a superior reputation 
lowers the barriers of entry to the political arena for a firm (Wang & Qian, 2011). Gaining access 
to the political arena allows for the development of an alliance with legislators and regulators 
(Schuler et al., 2002). Just as firms are concerned with reputation, so are politicians. A politician’s 
concern is derived from their desire to be reelected. Prior research has demonstrated that elected 
officials are less likely to associate with an organization that creates greater electoral risk (Smith, 
2000). Thus, by going after their target’s reputation (King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013) 
activists and social movements cause politicians to become concerned with incremental damage 
that could impact them because of their association with the organization (Mayhew, 1974; Pontikes 
et al., 2010). This in turn, hurts the firm’s ability to gain and maintain access within the political 
arena through invitations to congressional meetings and procurement contracts.  
Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that firms compete with other firms and non-
corporate interest groups to gain access to the political arena (Hansen, 1991; Bonardi et al., 2005). 
Firms can gain access through contributions (Wright, 1990; Kalla & Broockman, 2016). These 
contributions help organizations gain invitations to congressional committee meetings (Hansen, 
1991; Dreiling & Darves, 2011; Werner, 2015). The testimony in these congressional hearings 
“creates a public record of an association” (McDonnell & Werner, 2016). So, if a company were 
to become involved in a negative event, the association “could negatively affect politicians” 
(McDonnell & Werner, 2016). The reputational threat of social activism can also impact the 
number of procurement contracts awarded to a firm (McDonnell & Werner, 2016). Therefore, 
when a firm becomes the target of social activism, the firm experiences a decrease in congressional 
appearances and procurement contracts (McDonnell & Werner, 2016) and a lower likelihood to 
influence policy that will benefit the firm.  
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Thus, following a consumer boycott, targeted firms with a greater amount of political 
activity will face a higher reputational threat, and potentially a decrease in the number of 
invitations to congressional meetings and procurement contracts. Therefore, in line with CPA 
literature, the author expects a consumer boycott to have more of a negative impact on long-term 
firm value, when a firm has a higher amount of political activity. Hence, the author hypothesizes, 
H2: The greater a targeted firm’s political activity, the greater the decrease in the long-
term firm value for a targeted firm when a consumer boycott is announced. 
CEO Background 
Drawing from upper echelon literature, the author expects that a firm with a marketing 
chief executive officer (i.e., a CEO with a marketing background) will help to shield the targeted 
firm from the negative consequences of a consumer boycott. Prior literature has indicated that 
more firms are taking on a more customer centric mindset (Kumar & Shah, 2009) and focus on the 
customer with regards to how they can add to to firm growth (The NYSE Euronext CEO Report 
2008). For example, Robin Hayes, the CEO of JetBlue, stated that “Our customers must feel that 
we care about them…” (Reiss, 2019). Some firms, such as Southwest Airlines, even include the 
customer in its mission statement: 
The mission of Southwest Airlines is dedication to the highest quality of Customer 
Service delivered with a sense of warmth, friendliness, individual pride, and 
Company Spirit. 
 
A shift towards a customer centric mindset should be most easily integrated when a firm’s 
CEO has a marketing background because this type of CEO appreciates what marketing can bring 
to the table. This notion falls in line with upper echelon literature, which has found that a CEO’s 
personality and experience will influence not only their decision making, but also the firm’s 
strategic decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In other words, certain aspects of the CEO drive 
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a firm’s culture and employees’ attention towards things that the CEO believes to be vital for the 
“survival and growth of the firm” (Yadav et al., 2004). Additionally, aspects of the CEO also 
dictate priorities and the allocation of resources (Boeker 1989; Palmer et al., 1993). Thus, a CEO 
with a marketing background reinforces the “importance of relationship building and social 
interactions” (Auh & Menguc, 2008). These relationships and social interactions help to create a 
culture in which both customers and employees are seen as assets instead of expenses or liabilities 
(Berry, 1981; Rafiq & Ahmed, 1993). Which should influence customer satisfaction, loyalty, and 
retention (Auh & Menguc, 2008), and thereby firm performance (Anderson et al., 2004; Fornell et 
al., 2006). 
Thus, a targeted firm with a marketing CEO will want to deal with a boycott in a 
manner that protects customer satisfaction, loyalty, and retention. Therefore, in line with 
upper-echelon literature, the author expects a consumer boycott to have less of a negative 
impact on long-term firm value, when a firm’s CEO has a marketing background. Hence, 
the author hypothesizes, 
H3: Targeted firms with a marketing CEO will experience a smaller decrease in the long-
term firm value when a consumer boycott is announced. 
Marketing Influence in the TMT and Marketing Capabilities 
 Drawing from upper echelon and RBV literature, the author expects that the impact of a 
CEO’s background on firm performance following a consumer boycott will be mediated by the 
marketing influence in a firm’s TMT and a firm’s marketing capabilities.  
Marketing Influence  
Prior research has shown that a CEO’s background helps to explain some of the variation 
of marketing’s influence (Homburg et al., 1999; Verhoef & Leeflang, 2009). Specifically, Webster 
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et al. (2003) found that marketing influence within a firm is greater for firms with a marketing 
CEO because the CEO has a greater appreciation for the things that marketing brings to the table. 
In other words, a CEO with a marketing background will work to increase the amount of influence 
that marketing has within a firm.  
As for the link between marketing influence and firm performance, prior research has 
found mixed results (Merlo & Auh, 2009; Moorman & Rust, 1999; Verheof & Leeflang, 2009). 
However, when a firm finds itself in a negative situation, a firm’s marketing influence can help a 
firm to reduce the damage (Kashmiri et al., 2017). This is the case because marketing is responsible 
for being the voice of the customer (Kerin et al., 2005) and for protecting customer and brand 
equity (McGovern & Quelch, 2004). Additionally, a firm’s level of marketing influence can help 
an investor assess the firm’s crisis management skills (Xiong & Bharadwaj, 2013). Therefore, 
given that a CEO’s background can explain some of the variance in a firm’s marketing influence 
and the impact that marketing influence can have on firm performance, especially during a 
negative event, the author expects for marketing influence in the TMT to mediate the effect of 
CEO background on long-term firm value. Hence, the author hypothesizes,  
H4: Marketing influence in the TMT will mediate the effect of CEO background on long-
term firm value when a consumer boycott is announced. 
Marketing Capabilities 
Marketing capability is viewed as a firm-specific resource that provides a firm with a 
competitive advantage due to the rarity, inimitability, and sustainability of the resource (Barney, 
1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Song et al. 2007; Murray et al. 2011; Capron and Hulland 1999; 
Kozlenkova et al. 2014). In other words, marketing capability is the market knowledge a firm has 
about customer needs, and the experience a firm has as it relates to forecasting and responding to 
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customer needs (Day, 1994). Along the same lines of a firm’s marketing influence, the author also 
expects that firms whose CEO has a marketing background to place a greater emphasis on 
marketing capabilities. In fact, prior research has demonstrated that CEOs with functional 
experience in marketing has a positive influence on marketing capabilities (Rodenbach & Brettel, 
2012).  
 As for the relationship between marketing capabilities and firm performance, prior research 
has found that a firm’s marketing capabilities has a positive impact on firm performance (Nath et 
al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2012; Ngo & O’Cass, 2012; Vorhies & Morgan, 2005). Prior literature 
has also demonstrated that when a firm gets involved in a negative situation or scandal, investors 
find it difficult to determine what skills a firm has in terms of crisis management (Xiong & 
Bharadwaj, 2013). However, marketing capabilities can help reduce the cost associated with crisis 
response while limiting negative word-of-mouth and the damage to customer-related metrics such 
as customer loyalty and relationships (Xiong & Bharadwaj, 2013; Hoch & Deighton, 1989).  
Thus, given that a CEO’s background can positively impact marketing capabilities and that 
marketing capabilities can positively influence firm performance, the author expects for marketing 
capabilities to mediate the effect CEO background on long-term firm value. Hence, the author 
hypothesizes,  
H5: Marketing capabilities will mediate the effect of CEO background on long-term firm 
value when a consumer boycott is announced. 
Methodology 
Sample 
To develop our sample, the author used LexisNexis and Ethical Consumer to identify firms 
that are both listed on one of the two main stock exchanges in the United States (e.g., New York 
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Stock Exchange and NASDAQ) and have also been the target of a consumer boycott. The final 
sample size consisted of 145 U.S. firms from 1999 to 2017.  
Event study methodology 
The author used an event study methodology (Geyskens et al., 2002; Boyd et al., 2010; 
Kashmiri et al., 2017). However, instead of abnormal returns (ARs), this study calculated buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the year following a consumer boycott announcement. The 
BHARs are calculated by using the returns of a firm’s stock over at least a year long window, and 
then subtracting the cumulative performance of a benchmark portfolio with a similar risk profile 
during the same time frame (Barber & Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999). In other words, BHARs 
represent the actual experience of a hypothetical investor who buys and holds a stock for a pre-
determined amount of time (Sorescu et al., 2017).  
 
Regression Model and Control Variables 
The author regressed the BHARs (%) for each firm in the sample on the proposed 
explanatory variables. The author controlled for a firm’s prior performance, financial leverage, 
and firm size because poorly performing firms, firms with a greater amount of debt on its books, 
and smaller firms may have less of a safety net to fall back on. Additionally, the author also 
controlled for globalization and diversification. Firms with higher globalization experience a 
greater amount of sales outside of the U.S. and these customers may not care about a boycott thus 
the firm incurs less of a punishment from shareholders. As for diversification, a greater amount 
diversification is associated with less risk, and therefore a boycott will result in less negative buy-
and-hold abnormal returns. Additionally, the author controlled for advertising because higher 
levels of advertising can bring with it unwanted attention. CEO power was also controlled for 
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because a CEO’s power can influence the amount of discretion they have over firm decisions. 
Lastly, corporate social performance (CSP) was controlled for because a firm that is superior when 
it comes to social performance will be punished less by the shareholders.  
Data Measures and Sources 
Corporate governance measures Using the bios in each individual firm’s 10-Ks, the author 
dummy coded CEO background (1 = a CEO with a marketing background) (Merlo & Auh, 2009).  
Marketing measures Both marketing influence and capabilities were measured in the same 
manner as discussed in the previous two essays. Specifically, marketing influence in the TMT is 
measured by employing the approach used by Feng et al. (2015). Specifically, these five indicators 
for each firm year include: (1) the number of TMT members with marketing titles as a proportion 
of the total number of TMT executives; (2) a dummy variable indicating whether a marketing 
executive was mentioned among the top five most highly compensated TMT members in the firm’s 
proxy statement; (3) the hierarchical level of the highest-level marketing executive in the TMT, 
where president was recorded as 6, executive vice president as 5, senior vice president as 4, vice 
president as 3, other as 2, and no marketing executives as 1; (4) the cumulative hierarchical level 
of all the marketing executives in the firm’s TMT; and (5) the number of responsibilities reflected 
in marketing TMT executives’ job titles. Once these five indicators for each firm year were 
collected, the author combined them using principal component factor analysis. The author then 
rescaled the saved Bartlett factor score between 0 and 100. This rescaled factor score was then 
used as our measure of a firm’s marketing influence in the TMT in each firm-year. 
 Lastly, marketing capability was measured following the technique presented by Dutta et 
al. (1999). Specifically, marketing capability was measured by modeling a firm’s activities as an 
efficient frontier that relates its marketing investments (i.e., advertising, SG&A, and investments 
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in customer relationships) to an optimal attainment of the firm’s objectives (i.e., sales).  
Corporate political activity measures In accordance with prior research (e.g., Coates, 2012) the 
author measured a firm’s political activity by including the log transformed value for the sum of 
both a firm’s lobbying expenditures and contributions during the presidential election most prior 
to the boycott. These amounts were gathered from the “Open Secrets” website, which summarizes 
data from Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the U.S. Senate.  
Control variable measures. Using Compustat, the author measured prior performance as the ratio 
of net income to total assets for each firm-year, financial leverage as the ratio of total debt to total 
equity, and firm size as the natural log of the number of employees. As for globalization and 
diversification, globalization was measured as the ratio of a firm’s sales outside the U.S. and 
diversification was measured using an entropy measure based on two and four-digit-level segment 
sales (Palepu, 1985). Advertising was measured by converting advertising expenditures as a 
percentage of total assets. As for CEO power, it was operationalized as the natural log of a CEO’s 
overall compensation divided by the total compensation of the top five most highly paid executives 
within the firm (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2017). Lastly, corporate social performance was measured 
the same way it was measured in essay one and two by using the KLD analytics ratings. 
Results 
Effect of Consumer Boycott on Targeted Firms 
As shown in Table 3.1a, the author found support for H1, with the results indicating that in 
the year following a consumer boycott the targeted experienced a loss in shareholder wealth. The 
buy-and-hold abnormal return for the [0, +12 months] window was negative (BHARMarketModel = -
7.57). This abnormal return was significant according to both the Patell Z-test (p < .05) and the 
Generalized Z-test (p < .01). Furthermore, the buy-and-hold return was also negative and 
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significant in the two-year span following the consumer boycott (i.e., [0, +24 months]). The [0, 
+12 months] window associated with the Market Adjusted Model was also significant according 
to the Patell Z-test (p < .05) and Generalized Z-test (p < .10) (Table 3.2a). Lastly, adding further 
support to H1, the Appendices shows the results that are based on a different estimation window.  
Table 3.1a Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns for Targets (Market Model) 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 3.1b Average Monthly Abnormal Returns for Targets (Market Model) 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Buy-and-hold abnormal return
Market model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
[-6, 0] -1.50$ 42
[0, 0] 0.28 50
[0, 12] -2.23* 39
[0, 24] -2.03* 41
-7.57 -2.33**
-4.14 -1.73*
Table 1b    Cumulative returns for sample of boycotted firms
Generalized ZBHAR (%)
-22.3 -4.95***
0.88 0.98
Average monthly abnornal return (AAR)
Market model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
-5 0.47 54
-4 0.47 47
-3 -0.73 52
-2 0.86 41
-1 -1.58$ 41
0 0.28 50
1 1.13 57
2 -0.57 52
3 -1.91* 46
4 -1.05 40
5 -2.09* 43
0.88 -0.04
Table 1a    Average monthly abnormal retuns for sample of boycotted firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
-1.65 -2.04*
1.21 0.62
-1.62 -2.20*
-0.19 -0.71
-0.36 1.12
-0.94 -2.37**
1.03 1.62$
-2.08 -1.70*
-0.23 0.46
-1.17 -0.87
 75 
Table 3.2a Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns for Targets (Market Adjusted Model) 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 3.2b Average Monthly Abnormal Returns for Targets (Market Adjusted Model) 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Moderating Role of Corporate Political Activity and CEO Background 
 Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in the 
author’s regression model. 
Buy-and-hold abnormal return
Market adjusted model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
[-6, 0] -0.16 43
[0, 0] 0.07 48
[0, 12] -1.84* 44
[0, 24] 0.40 50
-5.03 -1.52$
-0.33 -1.69*
Table 2b    Cumulative returns for sample of boycotted firms
BHAR (%) Generalized Z
1.94 -0.03
0.17 -0.69
Average monthly abnornal return (AAR)
Market adjusted model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
-5 2.20* 30
-4 -0.16 57
-3 -0.60 48
-2 -0.53 44
-1 -0.32 52
0 0.08 48
1 0.46 52
2 -1.12 48
3 -1.68* 48
4 -0.21 48
5 -0.47 52
1.48 1.47$
0.17 -0.69
Table 2a    Average monthly abnormal retuns for sample of boycotted firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
-0.24 0.47
-1.33 -0.69
-0.46 -1.52$
0.07 -0.19
0.05 0.47
-0.68 -0.69
-0.83 -0.53
-0.33 -0.53
-0.19 0.31
 Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for Targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.64 1.73 1
1.83 0.50 0.02 1
0.10 0.31 0.05 -0.05 1
0.22 0.41 -0.09 0.14** 0.02 1
0.50 0.23 -0.24*** 0.13** -0.09 0.07 1
4.71 4.93 0.04 -0.23*** -0.10 0.10 -0.09 1
27.87 25.91 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.21*** 1
36.77 18.41 -0.02 0.65*** -0.03 0.08 0.15** -0.31*** 0.02 1
5.33 4.23 -0.02 0.06 -0.11* 0.03 0.26*** 0.03 0.15** -0.05 1
0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.11* 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.25*** 0.05 -0.17*** 0.08 1
0.42 0.26 0.01 -0.13** -0.07 0.13** 0.10 0.15** -0.02 -0.28*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 1
0.62 0.60 -0.09 0.10 -0.13** 0.25*** 0.10 0.15** 0.11 -0.13* 0.34*** 0.01 0.36*** 1
3.48 0.63 -0.19*** 0.43*** -0.06 0.24*** 0.21*** -0.28*** 0.06 0.31*** 0.11 -0.09 0.19*** 0.29*** 1
2.54 0.86 -0.18*** 0.46*** -0.09 0.24*** 0.22*** -0.16** -0.02 0.34*** 0.27*** -0.07 0.07 0.28*** 0.63*** 1
13 14
1. Abnormal return on day 0 (%)
2. Firm Size
3. Product Overlap
4. Director Interlock
7 8 9 10 11 12Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. Globalization
12. Diversification
13. Lobbying
14. Contributions
5. Institutional Ownership Overlap
6. Advertising Intensity
7. Marketing Influence
8. Marketing Capability
9. Corporate Social Performance
10. Prior Performance
Table 3    Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients
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With regards to a firm’s political activity, the results (Table 3.4) show that CPA is negative (β = -
1.85) but non-significant, thus no support for H2. As for the background of a CEO (i.e., marketing 
or non-marketing background), the results were negative (β = -4.43) but also non-significant, thus 
no support for H3. In addition to using BHAR as the dependent variable, the author ran two 
separate analyses with two different measures for firm performance as the dependent variables 
(i.e., Tobin’s q and return on assets). The results (Appendices) from these separate analyses 
remained fairly consistent with one exception with regards to CEO background. Specifically, when 
Tobin’s q was used as the DV, CEO background was both positive and significant (β = 0.19, p < 
.10). 
 The lack of support for the hypotheses related to a firm’s political activity and a CEO’s 
background may be the result of several things. First and foremost, the lack of support may be 
driven by the sample size being reduced from 145 to 69 due to missing data, which may lead to 
lower statistical power during an analysis.   
Mediating Role of Marketing Influence in the TMT and Marketing Capability 
 The author used PROCESS Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals to assess the indirect effect (IE) of CEO background on buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns simultaneously through both marketing influence in the TMT and marketing 
capability (Table 3.4) (Hayes, 2013). The results in Table 3.4 reveal that the confidence interval 
surrounding the IE of CEO background on long-term firm value through marketing influence in 
the TMT contained zero (IE = .19, [-3.14, 4.72]), suggesting that a marketing influence did not 
mediate the effect of CEO background. Thus, H4 is not supported. As for marketing capability, 
the results also revealed that the confidence interval surrounding the IE of CEO background on 
long-term firm value through marketing capability contained zero (IE = -.20, [-4.09, 3.58]), 
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suggesting that a marketing capability did not mediate the effect of CEO background. Thus, H5 is 
not supported.  
With regards to the hypotheses related to marketing capabilities and marketing influence 
in the TMT, prior research has given some indication of why these results turned out the way they 
did. Specifically, having TMT members with similar expertise such as marketing may be seen as 
a challenge to other members of the TMT (Pfeffer & Pfeffer, 1981). In other words, if a firm’s 
CEO has a background in marketing they may want the remainder of the TMT to be more balanced 
with respect to the other functional backgrounds. As a result of a more diverse TMT, the firm may 
take on more diverse strategies and place less of an emphasis on marketing-related strategies or 
resources. Additionally, a CEO with a marketing background may have the opinion that his or her 
marketing expertise is enough and doesn’t see the need for more executives with marketing 
backgrounds who could also potentially challenge him or her on strategic decisions. Thus, a 
marketing CEO could actually result in a decline in both marketing influence in the TMT and 
marketing capabilities. 
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Table 3.4 Mediation Analysis with BHARs for [0, +12] window for Targets 
 
  
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
  
Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
 As shown in the Appendices, the author performed a series of robustness checks and 
additional analyses that deal with (1) an alternate estimation window, (2) alternate measures for 
firm performance, and (3) missing data. 
 First, with regards to estimation windows, the results found in Table 3.1a and 3.1b are 
based on estimation window that begins 12 months prior to the event and ends 7 months prior to 
the event. In order to add further support for H1, the author runs an event study using an estimation 
Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect [CI]
-1.85 (5.10) 0.72
-4.43 (10.99) 0.69
0.19 [-3.14, 4.72]
-0.20 [-4.09, 3.58]
-0.66 (3.31) 0.84
-0.99 (7.64) 0.90
0.24 (.81) 0.77
1.26 (1.18) 0.29
-0.01 (.24) 0.95
-22.11 (12.01)* 0.07
28.44 (20.81) 0.18
-208.81 (87.92)** 0.02
15.35 (21.60) 0.48
Table 4  Results of mediation analysis with BHAR  (%) for [0, +12] window as DV
Model with estimation window [-12, -7]
Overall F-Test
Financial Leverage
Firm Size
Intercept
R2
N (number of firms)
Globalization
Prior Performance
H5: Marketing Capability
Diversification
Advertising 
Corporate Social Performance
CEO Power
Controls
19.5%
69
Model 1
Variables
Main Effects
H2: Corporate Political Activity
H3: CEO Background
Mediation
H4: Marketing Influence
F(12, 56) = 1.13
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window that begins 36 months prior to the event and ends 1 month before the event (Table 3.5a/b 
and Table 3.6a/b). Additionally, the author also used these buy-and-hold returns as the dependent 
variable in an additional analysis (Table 3.7). Second, the results from using two alternate firm 
performance measures (i.e., Tobin’s q and return on assets) can be found in Table 3.8. Lastly, the 
author used two approaches to deal with any missing data including multiple imputation and 
replacing any missing values with zeros (Table 3.9 and 3.10). Such results remained consistent 
with the findings found in the initial analysis.   
Discussion and Implications 
Even though the results above were mostly non-significant, they did provide some points 
worth discussing. First, the significant negative relationship between a consumer boycott and long-
term firm value for targeted firms suggests that the market reacts negatively in the year following 
a consumer boycott. Such a finding extends consumer boycott and social activism literature by 
demonstrating that a consumer boycott not only has a short-term impact, but also a long-term 
impact for those firms that become the target of a one.  
Second, based on the findings, the author adds to existing corporate political activity 
research by highlighting that a firm’s prior political activities through lobbying expenditures and 
contributions fails to act as a signal for investors. Specifically, the results provide no indication 
that a loss in reputation occurs as it relates to a firm’s involvement in the political arena that would 
also strengthen the negative impact of a consumer boycott in the long-term.  
Third, the findings extend marketing literature by indicating a lack of support for the notion 
that when a negative event occurs, having a CEO with a marketing background is associated with 
less negative long-term firm value. Additionally, the findings from this study demonstrate that just 
because a firm has a CEO with a marketing background does not mean that there will be greater 
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emphasis placed on having a greater marketing influence in the TMT or investing more in 
marketing capabilities. In fact, it adds further support to the notion that a marketing CEO may 
believe that their expertise is enough and other members with a marketing background could 
challenge them. Additionally, the marketing CEO may want a more diverse TMT, which in turn 
could result in the firm investing in several areas of the business and not primarily focusing on 
marketing-related resources such as marketing capabilities.  
In addition to extending several areas of research, the findings also provide implications 
for practitioners. First, given that a consumer boycott can have long-term effects on firm 
performance, the findings demonstrate the importance for a firm’s senior management to handle a 
negative event in an appropriate manner. Doing so can help those firms that become the target of 
a consumer boycott to reduce or eliminate any long-term damage to the firm.  
Second, with regards to investors, the findings indicate the importance of monitoring the 
firms that they invest in and whether the encounter a negative event. By monitoring a firm’s actions 
including when the firm finds itself at the center of a negative event, they will be able to sell all or 
a portion of their shares in order to avoid a loss in their investment or at least reduce the loss in 
their investment.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Our research has several limitations and several directions for future research. First, this 
study’s sample only consists of publicly listed firms. Thus, future research could take into account 
the impact of a consumer boycott on privately held firms from a performance perspective by 
examining how a consumer boycott impacts the private firm’s sales, customer purchase intentions, 
etc. Third, the present study focuses solely on consumer boycotts due to political reasons. So, 
future research could examine the impact of consumer boycotts that occur for reasons other than 
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political ones such as removing chemicals from baby products. Fourth, future research might also 
look at other firm-related outcomes (e.g., customer satisfaction or loyalty) as a result of a consumer 
boycott for those firms that are targeted. Lastly, future research could examine how firms respond 
to a consumer boycott and how those efforts impact long-term firm performance. For instance, 
does ignoring the boycott versus conceding to the demands of the boycotters result in differences 
in firm performance in the long-term. 
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Table 1.5a ARs for Lobbying for Good (Market Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 1.5b ARs for Lobbying for Good (Market Adjusted Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
  
Average daily abnormal return (AAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 0.48 55
-4 0.62 50
-3 4.84*** 64
-2 0.28 51
-1 -0.21 41
0 -2.24* 41
1 -2.20* 42
2 4.25*** 63
3 -3.00** 44
4 -1.72* 48
5 4.37*** 620.34 3.65***
0.30 3.94***
-0.18 -1.55$
-0.23 -0.43
0.01 -2.40**
-0.32 -2.26*
-0.19 -1.98*
0.08 0.42
0.44 4.22***
0.04 0.56
Table 5a Average daily abnormal returns for sample of politically active firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
0.03 1.82*
Average daily abnornal return (AAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 1.00 56
-4 1.18 55
-3 4.67*** 63
-2 0.93 54
-1 0.21 41
0 -2.23* 43
1 -1.39$ 38
2 4.76*** 65
3 -1.90* 45
4 -1.46$ 49
5 4.13*** 610.34 3.30***
0.33 4.43***
-0.13 -1.34$
-0.22 -0.22
0.02 -2.47**
-0.30 -1.91*
-0.16 -3.31***
0.11 1.47$
0.45 3.72***
0.08 1.33$
Table 6a Average daily abnormal retuns for sample of politically active firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
0.06 1.75*
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TABLE 1.6a CARs for Lobbying for Good (Market Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
TABLE 1.6b CARs for Lobbying for Good (Market Adjusted Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
  
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] -2.25* 41
[-2, 2] -0.05 48
[-1,  1] -2.69** 36
[-1, 0] -1.74* 38
[0, 1] -3.14*** 38
[0, 2] -0.11 50
-0.32 -3.24***
Table 5b Cumulative returns for sample of politically active firms
CAAR (%) Generalized Z
-0.52 -3.10***
-0.22 0.42
-0.32 -2.26*
-0.17 -0.29
-0.51 -3.67***
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] -2.23* 43
[-2, 2] 1.02 49
[-1,  1] -1.97* 40
[-1, 0] -1.43$ 39
[0, 1] -2.56** 37
[0, 2] 0.66 51
Table 6b Cumulative returns for sample of politically active firms
CAAR (%) Generalized Z
-0.30 -1.91*
-0.02 -0.22
-0.44 -2.75**
-0.28 -3.17***
-0.46 -3.60***
-0.13 0.35
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TABLE 1.7 OLS Regression with ARs on Day 0 for Lobbying for Good - Alternate 
Window 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
Overall F-Test
Intercept
R2
F(12, 86) = 2.54***
0.42 [-.43, 1.01]
0.21 [-.02, .10]
0.92 [-1.48, 1.33]
0.003 [-7.27, -1.54]
N (number of firms)
Advertising 
Corporate Headquarters
Table 7  Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Model 2
Variables
H3: Marketing Influence
Firm Size
H6: Institutional Ownership
Prior Performance
Model with estimation window [-299 -11]
H4: Marketing Capability
H5: Corporate Social Performance
H2: CEO Compensation
Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
-0.02 (.01)*
1.64 (.67)** 0.02 [.30, 2.97]
0.07 [-.04, .001]
0.32 [-.02, .06]
0.49 [-.14, .07]
0.01 [.56, 3.98]
0.57 [-2.96, 5.36]
0.93 [-.24, .26]
0.89 [-.90, 1.04]
Globalization
Diversification
Financial Leverage
26.2%
99
-4.40 (1.44)***
-0.07 (.71)
0.04 (.03)
0.29 (.36)
0.62 (.86)
0.07 (.49)
0.01 (.13)
1.20 (2.09)
2.27 (.86)**
-0.04 (.05)
0.02 (.02)
0.47 [-1.08, 2.32]
 TABLE 1.8 OLS Regression with Alternate Measures of Marketing Influence (Essay 1) 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
  
Proportion of TMT with marketing titles
Marketing executvie in top 5
H3: Marketing Influence (CMO Presence) -0.53 (.52)
H3: Marketing Influence (Marketing Executives)
-0.34 (.17)*
1.10 (.60)* 0.07 [-.10, 2.29]
0.06 [-.68, .01]
0.06 [-.01, .38]
-0.05 (.05)H5: Corporate Social Performance
Number of responsibilities
H4: Marketing Capability 0.01 (.02)
0.37 [-.15, .06]
0.28 [-.02, .06]
Combined all marketing executives
H6: Institutional Ownership 2.18 (.88)** 0.02 [.44, 3.93]
0.57 [-3.04, 5.48]
0.02 [.32, 3.65]
0.90 [-3.93, 4.45]
Coefficients (SE)
R2
Financial Leverage 0.01 (.13)
0.14 (.50)Firm Size
Diversification 0.26 (.36)
0.93 [-.24, .27]
0.79 [-.86, 1.13]
0.54 [-1.18, 2.25]
Corporate Headquarters -0.02 (.71)
N (number of firms)
Overall F-Test
Intercept
F(12, 86) = 2.24**
99
23.8%
F(16, 82) = 2.54***
99
33.1%
0.006 [-7.23, -1.23]
Table 8 Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Models with alternative measures of marketing influence in the TMT
P-Value (CI)
Model 4
0.02 [.29, 3.15]
0.75 [-.09, .13]
Variables Coefficients (SE)
H2: CEO Compensation 1.72 (.72)**
P-Value (CI)
Model 3
Advertising Intensity
Globalization
1.54 (.67)** 0.02 [.21, 2.86]
0.34 [-9.33, 3.23]-3.05 (3.16)
0.44 [-.02, .05]
0.32 [-1.57, .51]
Prior Performance 1.22 (2.14)
Highest level marketing executive
0.48 [-.46, .98]
0.26 [-.03, .09]
0.98 [-1.43, 1.40]
0.03 (.03)
0.53 (.86)
0.08 (.03)**
-0.29 (.71)
-4.36 (1.49)***
0.64 (.87)
0.03 (.52)
-0.01 (.13)
0.26 (2.11)
1.99 (.84)**
0.004 [-7.32, -1.40] -4.23 (1.51)***
0.02 (.06)
0.02 (.02)
-0.4 (.27)
0.19 (.10)*
0.15 [-.94, .14]
0.96 [-.26, .24]
0.95 [-1.00, 1.06]
0.47 [-1.10, 2.37]
0.30 [-.35, 1.15]0.40 (.38)
0.02 [.01, .14]
0.69 [-1.71, 1.13]
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 TABLE 1.9 OLS Regression with Alternate Measures of CSP (Essay 1) 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
H2: CEO Compensation 1.71 (.69)**
H3: Marketing Influence -0.02 (.01)*
H4: Marketing Capability
Variables Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
Model 5
0.34 [-.06, .02]
0.42 [-2.49, 5.93]
0.51 [-.34, .17]
0.40 [-.59, 1.47]
Globalization 0.15 (.87)
Diversification
0.15 [-.46, 2.85]
0.01 (.02)
H5: Corporate Social Performance
Net CSP (sum 3 years)
Net CSP (stock 3 years)
-0.02 (.02)
H6: Institutional Ownership 1.20 (.83)
Firm Size
Prior Performance 1.72 (2.12)
Financial Leverage -0.09 (.13)
F(12, 89) = 2.04**
102
F(12, 91) = 1.95**
104
Intercept -3.52 (1.41)***
R2
Advertising Intensity 0.06 (.03)*
Corporate Headquarters -0.05 (.72)
N (number of firms)
Overall F-Test
20.4%
Table 9 Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Models with alternative measures of corporate social performance
Model 6
0.02 [.34, 3.08]
-3.63 (1.38)***
0.097 [-.04, .003]
0.45 [-.02, .05]
0.86 [-1.57, 1.88]
0.78 [-.62, .83]
0.44 (.52)
0.92 [-.68, .76]
0.06 [-.003, .12]
P-Value (CI)Coefficients (SE)
-0.07 (.13)
1.16 (2.02)
1.34 (.82)
-0.02 (.04)
0.02 (.02)
-0.02 (.01)*
1.70 (.69)**
0.57 [-2.85, 5.17]
0.58 [-.33, .19]
0.02 [.34, 3.06]
0.08 [-.04, .002]
0.37 [-.02, .05]
0.62 [-.11, .06]
0.104 [-.28, 2.98]
0.94 [-1.49, 1.38]
0.01 [-6.38, -.89]
21.6%
0.04 (.36)
0.13 (.85)
0.27 (.49)
-0.05 (.72)
0.06 (.03)*
0.1 (.36)
0.07 [-.01, .12]
0.59 [-.72, 1.25]
0.88 [-1.56, 1.82]
0.94 [-1.48, 1.38]
0.01 [-6.32, -.72]
10
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TABLE 1.10 OLS Regression with Dummy Coding for Supreme Court Cases 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
  
Corporate Headquarters
Issue 1 - LGBT Rights
Issue 2 - Affirmative Action
Issue 3 - Discrimination
Table 10    Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Dummy coded Supreme Court case issues
Variables Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
Model 7
H2: CEO Compensation
Diversification
H6: Institutional Ownership
Prior Performance
Financial Leverage
H3: Marketing Influence
0.01 (.02) 0.58 [-.03, .05]H4: Marketing Capability
-0.03 (0.05) 0.54 [-.13, .07]H5: Corporate Social Performance
0.62 [-1.27, 2.11]0.42 (0.85)
N (number of firms) 99
Overall F-Test F(15, 83) = 2.43***
0.23 [-.02, .10]0.04 (0.03)
0.61 [-.53, .89]0.18 (0.36)
0.89 [-.27, .23]-0.02 (.13)
0.68 [-.76, 1.16]0.20 (.48)
Advertising 
0.14 (0.69) 0.84 [-1.24, 1.52]
0.87 (0.53) 0.103 [-.18, 1.91]
Intercept
0.44 (0.74) 0.55 [-1.04, 1.92]
R2 30.5%
Firm Size
Globalization
-4.70 (1.43)***
1.18 (0.57)**
 2.21 (.86)**
-0.02 (.01)*
 1.68 (.66)** 0.013 [.36, 3.00]
0.08 [-.04, .002]
0.01 [.49, 3.93]
0.04 [.04, 2.32]
0.001 [-7.55, -1.86]
0.59 [-2.98, 5.23]1.12 (2.06)
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TABLE 1.11 Two-Stage Heckman Analysis 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
Abnormal Returns
Financial Leverage
Firm Size
Advertising 
Intercept
Mills Lambda
Rho
Sigma
N (number of firms)
P-Value (CI)Coefficients (SE)
CPA Firms 
219
2.33 (.79)***
0.02 (.01)**
-0.04 (.04)
-0.16 (.62)
0.32 (.32)
0.83 (.76)
-4.28 (1.21)***
0.003 [.78, 3.87]
0.050 [.00002, .05]
0.33 [-.13, .04]
0.79 [-1.37, 1.05]
0.32 [-.31, .95]
0.27 [-.66, 2.32]
0.001 [-6.66, -1.90]
-.15 (.26) 0.58 [-.66, .37]
-0.58 (.66) 0.38 [-1.87, .71]
CEO Compensation 1.35 (.61)** 0.03 [.15, 2.56]
Institutional Ownership
Marketing Capability
Corporate Social Performance
Corporate Headquarters
Diversification
Globalization
Intercept
-0.34
1.73
Table 11 Two-Stage Heckman Analysis 
Variables
Prior Performance -2.47 (1.24)** 0.047 [-4.91, -.03]
-0.03 (.02) 0.15 [-.08, .01]
-0.03 (.16) 0.82 [-.34, .27]
0.12 (0.03)*** 0.001 [.05, .18]
 TABLE 1.12 OLS Regression with Approaches for Dealing with Missing Data (Essay 1) 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
Table 12   Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Variables Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
H2: CEO Compensation 1.03 (.48)** 0.04 [.07, 2.01]
H3: Marketing Influence -0.004 (.01) 0.35 [-.02, .01]
H4: Marketing Capability 0.02 (.01)** 0.02 [.004, .05]
H5: Corporate Social Performance
H6: Institutional Ownership
0.04 (.03)
0.28 (.51)
0.31 (.30)
0.26 (.60) 0.68 [-.93, 1.43]
Prior Performance -1.86 (1.64) 0.41 [-4.50, 1.83]
0.21 (.28)
0.34 (.60)
0.001 (.23)
Firm Size
Financial Leverage 0.01 (.03) 0.44 [-.04, .08]
0.47 [-.35, .76]
-3.85 (1.07)***
F(2, 189) = 1.53
202
Globalization 0.41 (.60) 0.57 [-.85, 1.52]
Diversification -0.07 (.25) 0.995 [-.45, .46]
0.30 [-.28, .90]
0.50 [-.78, 1.60]
0.78 [-.56, .42]
P-Value (CI) Coefficients (SE)
1.04 (.49)**
-0.01 (.01)
0.03 (.01)**
-0.02 (.04)
0.25 (.60)
-1.34 (1.60)
Overall F-Test
11.5%
F(12, 189) = 1.55
202
9.0%
Advertising 0.02 (.02) 0.12 [-.01, .10]
Corporate Headquarters 0.32 (.52) 0.58 [-.72, 1.29]
Intercept -3.62 (1.04)*** 0.000 [-5.96, -1.75]
0.16 [-.01, .05]
0.53 [-.69, 1.34]
0.001 [-5.67, -1.58]
R2
N (number of firms)
Model with missing values replaced with 0Model with imputed data
0.04 [.07, 1.98]
0.54 [-.02, .01]
0.048 [.0002, .05]
0.32 [-.10, .03]
0.67 [-.93, 1.45]
0.26 [-5.09, 1.37]
0.70 [-.05, .07]
-0.03 (.03) 0.48 [-.10, .04]
0.02 (.03)
Model 8 Model 9
10
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Table 2.5a ARs for Competitors (Market Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 2.5b ARs for Competitors (Market Adjusted Model) Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average daily abnornal return (AAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 -1.43$ 49
-4 2.68** 70
-3 -3.00** 41
-2 1.06 49
-1 -4.07*** 44
0 6.67*** 78
1 0.93 58
2 -3.05** 37
3 -2.05* 39
4 2.67** 63
5 -1.62$ 44
-0.21 -3.31***
0.19 4.03***
-0.20 -2.03*
0.66 8.54***
0.05 2.34**
-0.17 -4.22***
-0.36 -2.80**
0.05 -0.22
-0.53 -1.77*
-0.17 -0.22
0.21 6.09***
Table 5a    Average daily abnormal retuns for sample of competing firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
Average daily abnornal return (AAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
-5 -0.001 53
-4 2.43** 63
-3 -1.51$ 42
-2 1.13 48
-1 -6.18*** 37
0 9.86*** 85
1 0.28 53
2 -1.56$ 44
3 -3.04** 37
4 1.42$ 55
5 -2.85** 36
-0.28 -3.42***
0.08 2.00*
-0.29 -3.80***
0.87 11.28***
-0.02 1.35$
-0.08 -1.22
-0.29 -1.87*
0.05 -0.19
-0.68 -3.54***
-0.08 1.35$
0.17 4.58***
Table 6a    Average daily abnormal retuns for sample of competing firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
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TABLE 2.6a CARs for Competitors (Market Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
TABLE 2.6b CARs for Competitors (Market Adjusted Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] 6.67*** 78
[-2, 2] 0.69 52
[-1,  1] 2.04* 63
[-1, 0] 1.84* 62
[0, 1] 5.37*** 71
[0, 2] 2.63** 60
0.06 0.68
0.54 3.00**
0.17 4.16***
0.12 3.64***
0.70 6.48***
Table 5b    Cumulative returns for sample of competing firms
CAAR (%) Generalized Z
0.66 8.54***
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)
Market adjusted model
Day Patell Z % Positive 
[0, 0] 9.86*** 84
[-2, 2] 1.58$ 56
[-1,  1] 2.29* 66
[-1, 0] 2.61** 66
[0, 1] 7.17*** 81
[0, 2] 4.95*** 70
0.14 2.77**
0.77 6.77***
0.17 5.48***
0.20 5.61***
0.85 10.25***
Table 6b    Cumulative returns for sample of competing firms
CAAR (%) Generalized Z
0.87 11.28***
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TABLE 2.7 OLS Regression with ARs on Day 0 for Competitors - Alternate Window 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
H6: Corporate Social Performance
Table 7    Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Model with estimation window [-299 -11]
F(13, 48) = 4.86***
17.5%
95
Model 2
N (number of firms)
Overall F-Test
Intercept
Variables
0.73 (1.10)
-0.03 (.36)
-0.60 (.34)*
-0.50 (.32)
3.80 (2.00)*
0.51 [-1.49, 2.94]
0.93 [-.76, .69]
0.09 [-1.29, .09]
0.12 [-1.14, .14]
0.06 [-.22, 7.81]
R2
Lobbying
Contributions
Globalization
Diversification
H3a: Director Interlock
H3b: Institutional Ownership Overlap
H2a: Firm Size
H2b: Product Market Overlap
H5b: Marketing Capability
Prior Performance
H4: Advertising Intensity
H5a: Marketing Influence
Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
0.65 (.37)*
-2.09 (.83)**
0.03 (.04)
-0.01 (.01)
0.03 (.02)**
-0.61 (3.59)
-0.45 (.69)
0.12 (.11)
0.09 (.59)
0.51 [-1.83, .93]
0.08 [-.09, 1.39]
.88 [-1.10, 1.27]
0.02 [-3.76, -.41]
0.46 [-0.05, .11]
0.31 [-.03 .01]
0.03 [.003, .07]
0.27 [-.10, .34]
0.87 [-7.84, 6.62]
 TABLE 2.8 OLS Regression with Alternate Measures of Marketing Influence (Essay 2) 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
H6: Corporate Social Performance
Contributions
0.69 [-.10, .11]
0.04 [-3.87, -.05]-1.96 (.95)**
0.02 (.04)
-4.46 (7.57)
1.41 (1.46)
-0.18 (.21)
-0.10 (.16)
0.42 (.62)
0.02 (.02)
-0.58 (.31)
0.06 (.07)
-1.79 (3.95)
0.91 (1.08)
-0.19 (.60)
-0.66 (.42)
H3b: Institutional Ownership Overlap
Models with alternative measures of marketing influence in the TMT
0.93 [-1.11, 1.22]
0.49 [-.45, .93]
0.99 [-1.95, 1.98]
P-Value (CI) Coefficients (SE)
0.02 (.98)
0.24 (.34)
0.05 (.58)
Variables
H2a: Firm Size
H2b: Product Market Overlap
H3a: Director Interlock
Table 8 Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
H5a: Marketing Influence (Marketing Executives)
Combined all marketing executives
Marketing executvie in top 5
Proportion of TMT with marketing titles
Highest level marketing executive
0.56 [-19.68, 10.77]
0.34 [-1.53, 4.36]
Globalization
Prior Performance
Number of responsibilities
H4: Advertising Intensity
H5a: Marketing Influence (CMO Presence)
H5b: Marketing Capability
0.51 [-.84, 1.67]
0.34 [-.02, .06]
0.40 [-.60, .24]
0.54 [-.42, .23]
Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
-0.42 (.66)
-.57 (.35)
0.10 (.61)
-2.23 (.85)**
0.02 (.03)
0.68 (.71)
0.34 (4.22)
0.03 (.01)**
F(13, 48) = 3.56***
95
17.1%
0.09 (.09)
0.98 (1.29)
-0.03 (.38)
-0.68 (.37)*
-0.51 (.35)
3.87 (1.91)**
Overall F-Test
N (number of firms)
R2
Intercept
Lobbying
Diversification
4.33 (.161)***
Model 3 Model 4
0.53 [-1.76, .91]
0.11 [-.12, 1.27]
0.87 [-1.12, 1.32]
0.01 [-3.93, -.53]
0.53 [-.04, .09]
0.34 [-.75, 2.10]
0.02 [.01, .06]
0.32 [-.09, .27]
0.94 [-8.13, 8.82]
0.45 [-1.62, 3.58]
0.93 [-.80, .73]
0.07 [-1.42, .06]
0.15 [-1.21, .19]
0.048 [.04, 7.71]
0.11 [-1.12, .11]
0.01 [1.09, 7.56]
0.35 [-.07, .19]
0.65 [-9.74, 6.15]
0.41 [-1.26, 3.07]
0.76 [-1.39, 1.02]
0.13 [-1.50, .19]
F(17, 48) = 5.52***
95
22.3%
11
1 
 
  
 
TABLE 2.9 OLS Regression with Alternate Measures of CSP (Essay 2) 
 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
 
0.04 [.002, .06]
H3b: Institutional Ownership Overlap
H4: Advertising Intensity
H5a: Marketing Influence -0.01 (.01) 0.25 [-.03, .01]
H6: Corporate Social Performance
Table 9    Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Variables
H2a: Firm Size
H2b: Product Market Overlap
H3a: Director Interlock
0.89 [-6.95, 8.02]
0.18 [-0.05, .26]
.18 [-.03, .17]
.04 [.002, .06]
.23 [-.04, .07]
.70 [-7.23, 10.65]
H5b: Marketing Capability
Prior Performance
Globalization
0.03 (.02)**
0.07 (.05)
1.71 (4.45)
0.08 (.88)
Net CSP (stock 3 years)
Overall F-Test
Net CSP (sum 3 years)
Intercept
R2
N (number of firms)
Diversification
Lobbying
Contributions
Models with alternative measures of corporate social performance
Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
Model 5
-2.04 (.88)**
0.09 (.54)
0.41 (.30)
0.02 (.03) 0.43 [-.04, .09]
0.02 [-3.78, -.33]
0.83 [-1.00, 1.24]
0.11 [-.13, 1.20]
0.51 [-1.85, .94]-0.49 (.72)** 0.50 [-1.95, .96]
0.17 [-.18, 1.01]
.58 [-.04, .07]
.02 [-3.80, -.29]
.86 [-1.00, 1.19]
0.050 [-.003, 7.96]
0.07 [-1.25, .06]
0.099 [-1.34, .12]
0.75 [-.91, .66]
0.77 [-1.77, 2.36]
4.13 (1.95)**
-0.12 (.39)
-0.60 (.36)*
-0.59 (.32)*
3.98 (1.98)**
.93 [-1.70, 1.85]
.04 [.21, 8.06]
.07 [-1.32, .05]
.104 [-1.37, .13]
.68 [-.99, .65]-0.17 (.41)
-0.62 (.37)
-0.63 (.34)*
P-Value (CI) Coefficients (SE)
Model 6
F(13, 49) = 5.53***
96
21.7%
F(13, 49) = 5.40***
96
19.9%
-0.46 (.69)
0.54 (.33)
0.12 (.56)
-2.06 (.86)**
0.02 (.03)
-0.01 (.01)
0.03 (.02)**
0.10 (.08)
0.54 (3.72)
0.30 (1.03)
11
2 
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TABLE 2.10 OLS Regression with Dummy Coding for Consumer Boycott Issues 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
H6: Corporate Social Performance
Contributions
Overall F-Test
Table 1 Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
Dummy coded consumer boycott issues
Variables
Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
Model 7
H2a: Firm Size -0.57 (.70) 0.42 [-1.98, .83]
H2b: Product Market Overlap 0.65 (.62) 0.30 [-.60, 1.90]
H3a: Director Interlock -0.02 (.53) 0.97 [-1.08, 1.04]
H3b: Institutional Ownership Overlap -2.26 (.89)** 0.014 [-4.05, -.49]
H4: Advertising Intensity 0.03 (.05) 0.58 [-.07, .12]
H5a: Marketing Influence -0.01 (.01) 0.36 [-.03, .01]
H5b: Marketing Capability 0.04 (.02)* 0.07 [-.004, .09]
0.11 (.11) 0.31 [-.10, .32]
Prior Performance -0.36 (4.71) 0.94 [-9.82, 9.10]
Globalization 0.87 (1.33) 0.52 [-1.80, 3.53]
Diversification -0.04 (.43) 0.92 [-.91, .82]
0.72 [-1.39, .97]
Lobbying -0.56 (.42) 0.19 [-1.41, .29]
Boycott 1- Anti-Conservative 0.30 (.58) 0.61 [-.87, 1.46]
Intercept 3.52 (2.43) 0.15 [-1.36, 8.41]
F(20, 48) = 4.01***
-0.46 (.32) 0.15 [-1.10, .17]
R2 19.2%
N (number of firms) 95
Boycott 5 - Gun Rights
Boycott 2- Domestic Policy -0.17 (.89) 0.85 [-1.97, 1.62]
Boycott 3 - LGBT Rights 1.01 (.50)** 0.050 [-.001, 2.02]
Boycott 4 - Foreign Policy 0.43 (.53) 0.42 [-.64, 1.50]
0.21 (.75) 0.78 [-1.29, 1.70]
Boycott 6 - Abortion -0.14 (.89) 0.88 [-1.93, 1.65]
Boycott 7 - Anti-War -0.21 (.59)
  
 
TABLE 2.11 OLS Regression with Approaches for Dealing with Missing Data (Essay 2) 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
  
H6: Corporate Social Performance
Diversification
Table 10    Results of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 (%) as dependent variable
R2
N (number of firms)
Overall F-Test
Lobbying -0.31 (.13)**
Contributions -0.10 (.20)
Intercept 1.52 (.78)*
Prior Performance 0.03 (2.07)
Globalization 0.66 (.68)
H5a: Marketing Influence -0.004 (.005)
H5b: Marketing Capability 0.01 (.01)**
0.02 (.04)
Variables
Coefficients (SE)
H2a: Firm Size -0.20 (.31)
H2b: Product Market Overlap 0.26 (.25)
H3a: Director Interlock -0.19 (.19)
H3b: Institutional Ownership Overlap -0.005 (.003)
H4: Advertising Intensity
-1.15 (.48)**
-0.23 (.20)
0.26 (.27)
-0.08 (.28)
0.70 [-.03, .05]
0.23 [-.01, .003]
0.02 [.002, .02]
0.77 [-.64, .48]
0.33 [-.27, .79]
0.24 [-.62, .16]
0.02 [-2.11, -.20]
P-Value (CI)
Model with imputed data Model with missing values replaced with 0
Coefficients (SE) P-Value (CI)
Model 8 Model 9
F(13, 133) = 3.22***
241
7.9%
0.51 [-.81, .41]
0.053 [-.02, 3.05]
0.62 [-.49, .29]
0.02 [-.56, -.05]
0.98 [-.37, .37]
0.33 [-.69, 2.01]
0.99 [-4.06, 4.13]
0.51 [-.05, .09]
0.03 [.001, .02]
0.41 [-.01, .01]
0.046 [-.01. -.0001]
0.15 [-.01, .001]
0.31 [-.56, .18]
0.29 [-.23, .75]
-0.004 (.19)
-0.01 (.003)**
0.12 [-.01, .12]
0.92 [-4.27, 3.85]
0.499 [-.93, 1.90]
0.62 [-.29, .49]
0.08 [-.52, .03]
0.44 [-.47, .20]
0.04 [.08, 2.97]
0.05 (.03)
0.01 (.01)**
-0.005 (.004)
0.01 (.02)
F(13, 133) = 3.41***
241
10.5%
1.52 (.73)**
-0.13 (.17)
-0.24 (.14)*
0.10 (.20)
0.49 (.72)
-0.21 (2.05)
11
4 
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TABLE 3.5a BHARs for Targets (Market Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
TABLE 3.5b Average Monthly ARs for Targets (Market Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
  
Buy-and-hold abnormal return
Market model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
[-6, 0] -1.49$ 39
[0, 0] -0.20 47
[0, 12] -1.97* 42
[0, 24] -1.51$ 47
-4.23 -1.77*
-8.26 -0.61
-2.61 -2.60**
0.43 -0.61
Table 5b    Cumulative returns for sample of boycotted firms
BHAR (%) Generalized Z
Average monthly abnornal return (AAR)
Market model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
-5 0.73 58
-4 0.03 55
-3 -0.53 49
-2 -1.29$ 41
-1 -1.64$ 43
0 -0.19 47
1 0.36 49
2 -0.68 54
3 -1.52$ 48
4 -0.01 43
5 -1.45$ 45-1.05 -1.11
-0.10 1.05
-0.82 -0.44
-0.37 -1.44$
-1.17 -1.44$
0.43 -0.61
0.42 -0.11
0.18 1.38$
-0.13 -0.11
-1.34 -1.94*
Table 5a    Average monthly abnormal retuns for sample of boycotted firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
0.35 2.05*
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Table 3.6a BHARs for Targets (Market Adjusted Model) – Alternate Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
TABLE 3.6b Average Monthly ARs for Targets (Market Adjusted Model) – Alternate 
Window 
 
 
$p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
  
Buy-and-hold abnormal return
Market adjusted model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
[-6, 0] -0.25 43
[0, 0] -0.33 48
[0, 12] -2.17* 44
[0, 24] -0.15 50
-5.03 -1.26
1.94 -.24
-0.33 -1.42$
0.17 -0.43
Table 6b    Cumulative returns for sample of boycotted firms
BHAR (%) Generalized Z
Average monthly abnornal return (AAR)
Market adjusted model
Month Patell Z % Positive 
-5 1.94* 57
-4 -.27 50
-3 -1.12 48
-2 -0.31 44
-1 -0.37 52
0 -0.33 48
1 0.29 52
2 -1.22 48
3 -1.74* 48
4 0.24 48
5 -0.47 52-0.19 0.57
-0.68 -0.43
-0.83 -0.26
-0.33 -0.26
-0.24 0.74
0.17 -0.43
0.05 0.74
0.07 0.07
-1.33 -0.43
-0.46 -1.26
Table 6a    Average monthly abnormal retuns for sample of boycotted firms
Average abnormal return (%) Generalized Z
1.48 1.73*
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TABLE 3.7 Mediation Analysis with BHARs for Targets – Alternate Window 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
  
Indirect Effect (CI) Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect [CI]
-2.30 (5.44) 0.67
-10.20 (11.72) 0.39
-0.001 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.05 [-3.00, 4.22]
0.001 [-0.01, 0.01] -0.14 [-3.94, 2.96]
0.79 (3.53) 0.82
0.06 (8.15) 0.99
0.30 (.86) 0.73
2.37 (1.26)* 0.06
-0.05 (.25) 0.85
-19.95 (12.81) 0.13
41.60 (22.18)* 0.07
-254.62 (93.72)*** 0.009
Globalization
Prior Performance
Intercept 19.78 (23.03)
R2 24.4%
N (number of firms) 69
Overall F-Test F(12, 56) = 1.50
Table 7    Results of mediation analysis with BHAR  (%) for [0, +12] window as DV
Model with estimation window [-36, -1]
Variables
Model 2
Main Effects
H2: Corporate Political Activity
H3: CEO Background
Mediation
H4: Marketing Influence
H5: Marketing Capability
Controls
CEO Power
Diversification
Advertising 
Corporate Social Performance
Financial Leverage
Firm Size
 TABLE 3.8 Mediation Analysis with Alternate Measures of Firm Performance 
  
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI) Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI)
0.33 (.20) 0.11 0.001 (.01) 0.87
0.23 (.44) 0.61 0.02 (.02) 0.34
-0.02 [-0.24, 0.14] -0.001 [-0.01, 0.01]
-0.0004 [-0.003, 0.003] -0.01 [-0.17, 0.15] 0.001 [-0.01, 0.01]
-0.04 (10.13) 0.72 0.003 (.01) 0.53
-0.27 (.31) 0.37 -0.01 (.01) 0.62
0.05 (.03) 0.14 -0.0004 (.001) 0.74
-0.03 (.05) 0.48 0.002 (.002) 0.25
-0.0001 (.01) 0.99 -0.0002 (.0004) 0.58
-0.57 (.48) 0.24 0.001 (.02) 0.96
1.02 (.84) 0.23 0.05 (.03) 0.14
8.34 (3.73)** 0.03
0.02 (.004)*** 0.0003
0.52 (.87) 0.55 0.12 (.03)*** 0.001
Overall F-Test F(12, 56) = 2.25** F(12, 56) = 3.46***
Table 8    Results of mediation analysis with alternate measures of firm performance
Return on Assets
R2 30.1% 42.5%
N (number of firms) 69 69
Financial Leverage
Firm Size
Globalization
Prior Performance
Return on Assets
Model 4
Tobin's Q
Variables
Model 3
Diversification
Advertising 
Corporate Social Performance
Main Effects
H2: Corporate Political Activity
H3: CEO Background
Mediation
H4: Marketing Influence
H5: Marketing Capability
Controls
CEO Power
Tobin's Q
Intercept
11
8 
 TABLE 3.9 OLS Regression with Multiple Imputation 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect Effect [CI] Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI) Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI) Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI)
1.58 (3.09) 0.61 0.14 (.12) 0.24 -0.001 (.01) 0.86
-6.87 (6.77) 0.31 0.49 (.27)* 0.07 0.01 (.01) 0.25
1.53 [-0.72, 5.30] 0.04 [-0.03, 0.18] -0.001 [-0.01, 0.002]
-0.20 [-4.09, 3.58] -0.23 [-2.03, 1.12] -0.001 [-0.04, 0.04] -0.001 [-0.003, 0.004]
-0.36 (2.66) 0.89 -0.08 (.11) 0.48 -0.001 (.005) 0.88
-1.58 (5.70) 0.78 -0.27 (.23) 0.24 0.002 (.01) 0.88
-0.04 (.14) 0.79 0.02 (.01)*** 0.001 -0.001 (.002)** 0.02
0.64 (.57) 0.27 0.02 (.02) 0.28 0.0004 (.001) 0.70
0.04 (.28) 0.86 -0.03 (.01)*** 0.002 0.0006 (.001) 0.22
1.67 (7.07) 0.81 -0.08 (.28) 0.78 0.002 (.01) 0.85
36.79 (12.91)*** 0.01 0.59 (.51) 0.25 0.04  (.02)* 0.09
-122.85 (46.32)*** 0.01
10.37 (1.87)*** 0.0001
0.02 (.003)*** 0.001
5.47 (14.31) 0.70 0.72 (.57) 0.21 0.06 (.03)** 0.03
Overall F-Test F(12, 132) = 1.80* F(12, 132) = 1.82***
Mediation
H4: Marketing Influence
Controls
CEO Power
Diversification
Advertising 
Corporate Social Performance
H5: Marketing Capability
F(12, 132) = 5.15***
Firm Size
Globalization
Prior Performance
Intercept
R2 14.1% 32.2%
N (number of firms) 145 145
Financial Leverage
31.9%
145
Tobin's Q
Return on Assets
H3: CEO Background
Table 9    Results of mediation analysis with alternate measures for firm performance (missisng values replaced with multiple imputation)
Variables
Model 5 Model 6
Main Effects
H2: Corporate Political Activity
Model 7
Return on AssetsTobin's QBHAR
11
9  
 Table 3.10 OLS Regression with Replacing Missing Values 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
  
Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI) Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI) Coefficients (SE) P-Value Indirect Effect (CI)
1.80 (3.11) 0.56 0.19 (.13) 0.12 0.01 (.01) 0.29
-7.03 (6.82) 0.30 0.51 (.27)* 0.07 -0.003 (.01) 0.64
1.16 [-1.03, 4.69] 0.02 [-0.05, 0.14] -0.001 [-0.01, 0.003]
-0.001 [-0.003, 0.004] -0.12 [-1.82, 1.20] -0.002 [-0.04, 0.04] -0.0004 [-0.003, 0.003]
-0.36 (2.66) 0.89 -0.10 (.11) 0.40 -0.0004 (.005) 0.93
-3.15 (5.08) 0.54 -0.18 (.21) 0.38 -0.001 (.01) 0.95
0.01 (.59) 0.99 0.05 (.02)* 0.03 -0.002 (.001)* 0.06
0.63 (.58) 0.28 0.02 (.02) 0.30 0.00 (.001) 0.99
-0.01 (.21) 0.94 -0.01 (.01) 0.53 -0.0003 (.0004) 0.46
0.96 (7.17) 0.89 -0.11 (.29) 0.70 0.001 (.01) 0.96
29.26 (12.10)** 0.02 0.53 (.49) 0.28 0.03 (.02) 0.13
-125.37 (42.87)*** 0.004
7.29 (1.77)*** 0.0001
0.02 (.003)*** 1E-04
8.58 (14.63) 0.56 0.92 (.59) 0.12 0.07 (.03)** 0.02
Overall F-Test F(12, 132) = 1.63* F(12, 132) = 4.40*** F(12, 132) = 4.79***
12.9% 28.6% 30.4%
N (number of firms) 145 145 145
Corporate Social Performance
Financial Leverage
Firm Size
Globalization
Prior Performance
Intercept
Tobin's Q
Return on Assets
R2
Return on Assets
Table 10    Results of mediation analysis with alternate measures for firm performance (missing values replaced with zeros)
Variables
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Main Effects
H2: Corporate Political Activity
H3: CEO Background
Mediation
Advertising 
H4: Marketing Influence
H5: Marketing Capability
Controls
CEO Power
Diversification
Tobin's QBHAR
12
0 
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Table 4.1 Marketing Capability Measure 
 
The author measured marketing capability by using a stochastic frontier approach (Dutta et al. 
1999). We used the Cobb-Douglas (C-D) formulation, and in line with Dutta et al. (1999) specified 
the marketing transformation function as follows: 
 
(1) ln(salesit) = α0 + α1×ln(Ad stockit) + α2×ln(SG&A stockit) + α3×ln(Receivables Stock)it + εit-
ηit  
 
where i and t represent firm i and year t respectively; The parameter α1 represents the % change in 
sales, as a result of a 1 % change in Ad stock. Similar interpretations hold for the parameters α2 
and α3; εit represents the purely stochastic error component affecting output which is assumed to 
follow a normal (0, σε2) distribution; ηit represents the inefficiency error component which is 
assumed to be an independent and identically distributed non-negative random variable which 
follows a N(µit, ση2) half-normal distribution, µ being the mode marketing inefficiency in the 
sample.  
 
The author used a Koyck-Lag structure to calculate Ad stock, SG&A stock, and Receivables 
Stock. For example, Ad stock for period t was defined as  
(2) Ad stockt = k
tk
k
kt enseAd exp
1
×∑
=
=
−ω .  
The author used a spillover weight ω of 0.5 and a lag of 5 years prior to the focal year t. Based on 
the difference between the maximum marketing output achievable, and the observed output, we 
obtained an estimate of the composite error, (εit-ηit). We used this estimate to obtain a consistent 
estimate of firm-specific marketing inefficiency, ηˆit. We then normalized the marketing 
inefficiency values so that the normalized inefficiency values ranged from 0 (most efficient firm) 
to 1 (least efficient firm). We next used these normalized inefficiency values to calculate the 
marketing capability of each firm using the following equation:  
 
(3) (Marketing Capability)it = (1− ˆηit)×100%. 
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Controversies”, Proceedings of the 2017 Society for Marketing Advances Conference 
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Morgan, A., Kashmiri, S., Shaner, M. (2020), “I’ll be There for You: Investors’ 
Response to a Firm’s Lobbying for Good Efforts,” targeted for Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science. 
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Intro to Retailing: Summer II, 2019, University of Mississippi  
Principles of Marketing: Fall, 2018, University of Mississippi  
Principles of Marketing: Summer II, 2018, University of Mississippi  
Principles of Marketing: August Intersession, 2017, University of Mississippi 
SERVICE 
Reviewer – 2017 – Society for Marketing Advances Conference 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION 
American Marketing Association 
AMA Doctoral Student SIG 
Society for Marketing Advances 
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Academic Experience 
Instructor & Graduate Assistant, University of Mississippi (2016 - 2020), Oxford, 
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